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ABSTRACT
Environmental policy in the United States is increasingly relying on incentive-based 
mechanisms (IBM). Incentive-based mechanisms, are voluntary environmental 
management instruments based on free market environmentalism, a framework that 
attempts to harness market forces. A multi-disciplinary approach was developed to 
evaluate participation decisions in IBM’s such as the Wetland Reserve Program. This 
approach extended the traditional utility maximization approach to choice behavior by 
including alternative measures of environmental attitudes based on the theory of reasoned 
action or the New Environmental Paradigm. The addition of these psychological constructs 
conceptually improved the utility maximization by allowing the consideration of well 
established determinants o f behavior.
Probit and Tobit models derived from the conceptual framework were empirically 
tested using primary data collected via a mail survey of Louisiana wetland owners. Results 
presented suggest that the acreage of wetlands owned, the level of information about the 
WRP, respondents’ involvement in environmental organizations, education level, income, 
the number of people living in the household, and attitudes were significant in explaining 
Louisiana wetland owners’ decision to offer to participate as well as the level of 
participation in the WRP.
The significance of attitude measures as explanatory factors suggests that a 
successful implementation of IBM programs depends, in addition to getting the economic 
incentive “right”, on properly addressing attitudinal concerns. Comparison between the
xi
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specific attitude measures derived from the theory of reasoned action and the general NEP- 
based environmental attitude was inconclusive. Therefore, until further evaluation, these 
alternative measures can be used interchangeably.
xii
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-sixties, there has been an increasing concern for a variety of 
environmental issues and a greater demand for environmental amenities in the United 
States. Environmental amenities are desirable attributes of natural or environmental 
resources. Air and water quality, solid waste management, ozone depletion, and the 
preservation of endangered species and their habitat are among the major environmental 
concerns of citizens and regulators alike (Brown, 1993). The management of the 
environment is undergoing an evolution in response to the growing demand for 
environmental amenities and societal preferences for improved environmental quality. 
Agricultural environmental management is also evolving to reflect society's increased 
recognition of the detrimental role agriculture often plays in environmental degradation. 
For example, agriculture is now recognized as a major contributor to soil erosion, 
wetland conversion, and groundwater contamination (Batie, 1990).
Environmental Management
In the United States, environmental management has most recently been based on 
direct regulation (Nash, 1990). Under this regulatory approach, also known as command 
and control, rules, guidelines, and penalties are the main instruments used by regulatory 
agencies to protect and restore the environment (Dudek and Palmisano, 1988). 
Guidelines used under the command and control approach can be divided into two 
categories: technology-based and emission-based standards. Under a technology standard,
1
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the regulatory agency imposes the technology to be used by a given polluter or for a 
given activity. The technology imposed is based on the best available technology (BAT) 
for the activity considered. A BAT regulation requires polluters to use the best available 
technology if it does not force the polluter to shut down (Ackerman and Stewart, 1988). 
The required installation of chimney scrubbers for utility companies is an example of a 
BAT regulation. For emission standards, the regulatory agency predetermines the 
maximum level of emission or discharge allowed to a given polluter or group of polluters 
in a given region. Ambient standards for criteria air pollutants set in the Clean Air Act 
of 1990 are an example o f emission standards (Bryner, 1993).
Environmental management by direct regulation relies on the centralization of a 
diverse and large body of information within few regulators (Anderson and Leal, 1991). 
Unfortunately, this information is very costly and often impossible to gather for many 
current environmental problems (Anderson, Hofmann, and Rusin, 1990). Furthermore, 
compliance with environmental regulations is increasingly expensive. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) reports that the United States spends more than $100 billion 
annually to comply with environmental regulations (Stavins, 1991). Ineffectiveness in 
achieving improved environmental quality at affordable costs (Anderson, Hofmann, and 
Rusin, 1990), the lack of incentives for technological improvement (Anderson and Leal, 
1991), and high costs of the command and control approach have led lawmakers and 
economists to consider alternative environmental management strategies.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Agricultural Environmental Management
Until recently, environment management in the U.S. has exempted agriculture. 
The agricultural sector has long benefitted from a tacit exemption from many 
environmental regulation and management strategies. Stemming from what has been 
described as a social contract with agriculture, society's primary concern was to 
guarantee and stabilize farmers' income through various commodity programs (Batie,
1990). As a result, the agricultural sector has enjoyed, until the Food Security Act (Farm 
Bill) of 1985, a self-regulating status.
In the 1980s, growing concern over environmental quality and evidence of the 
many adverse effects of agriculture on the environment prompted policy makers and 
society at large to question the self-regulating position granted to the agricultural sector. 
The Sodbuster, Swampbuster, and Conservation Compliance provisions of the Farm Bill 
of 1985 marked a shift in the social contract with agriculture (Batie, 1990). Under these 
cross-compliance programs, farmers' eligibility for U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) program benefits is tied to the adoption and implementation of approved 
conservation plans (Carlson, Zilberman, and Miranowski, 1993).
The implementation of incentive-based conservation programs constitutes another 
step in the evolution of agricultural environmental policy. The Conservation Reserve 
(CRP), the Water Bank (WBP), and the Wetlands Reserve (WRP) programs provide 
economic incentives to farmers willing to adopt conservation or restoration practices. For 
example, under the provisions of the CRP, USDA offers compensation to farmers willing
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to retire highly erodible cropland from production. These incentive-based programs are 
also referred to as "green payments" (Hoag, Weber, and Duffy, 1995).
The search for environmental management tools able to efficiently address current 
environmental problems, including the destructive role often played by agriculture has 
resulted in increased consideration of alternative management strategies in environmental 
policy. Free market environmentalism (Anderson and Leal, 1991) is the principal 
alternative approach suggested.
Incentive-Based Mechanisms
Free market environmentalism (Anderson and Leal, 1991) is an alternative 
environmental management framework advocated by legal scholars (Ackerman and 
Stewart, 1988), economists (Tietenberg, 1990; Stavins, 1988; Randall, 1987), and 
politicians (Heinz and Wirth, 1988). Contrary to command and control, which is often 
based on bureaucratic decisions, free market environmentalism relies on market forces 
for environmental management. Specific environmental management instruments used 
within this framework are called incentive-based mechanisms (IBM) or market-based 
incentives.
Incentive-based mechanisms can take various forms. They either rely on the 
"polluter pays" principle or provide economic compensation to elicit a targeted 
environmental behavior. Incentive-based environmental strategies influence the behavior 
of individuals, households and firms by creating a system of penalties and rewards. 
Incentive-based mechanisms require clearly defined property rights and make each 
resource user, owner, or trustee bear the full cost and/or reap the entire benefits of her
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actions. It is argued that dollars spent to comply with environmental rules and regulations 
would have a greater impact if used to provide economic incentives (Dudek and 
Palmisano, 1988; Stewart, 1988; Tietenberg, 1990). Incentive-based environmental 
strategies include green taxes, deposit-refimd schemes, emission fees, and individual 
transferable quotas.
In agriculture, market-based environmental strategies have been mainly used to 
promote desirable behavior through the use of positive economic incentives. For 
example, in agricultural land policy, conservation and restoration practices are 
increasingly elicited through the transfer (TDR) or purchase of development rights 
(PDR). Under a PDR system, the private land owner "voluntarily sells the development 
rights and receives compensation for the development restrictions placed on the land" 
(Daniels, 1991, p.421). Development rights are also known as conservation easements. 
Under TDR arrangements, incentives are provided for temporary development 
restrictions. TDRs and PDRs were initially created to protect farmland against rapid 
urbanization and were mainly used as state and local land use policies. Provisions of the 
1985 and 1990 Farm Bills revived and reoriented the focus of TDRs and PDRs from 
state level farmland protection to national conservation and restoration practices. For 
example, the Conservation Reserve Program provides compensation for temporary 
development rights restrictions on highly erodible agricultural land. On the other hand, 
the Wetlands Reserve Program purchases permanent easements on wetlands.
Despite the theoretical appeal of incentive-based mechanisms and the potential 
savings they can generate (Stavins and Whitehead, 1992), their effective application is
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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still very limited in the United States (Anderson, Hofmann, and Rusin, 1990). Special 
interests and the prevailing property rights regime have been identified as some of the 
limiting factors.
Special Interests
Several special interest groups are comfortable with the traditional command and 
control approach and favor a status quo (Dudek and Palmisano, 1988). The very 
existence of the environmental bureaucracy and its agency engineers is threatened by a 
wide application of incentive-based mechanisms. Moreover, lobbyists who have already 
learned to manipulate the regulatory system, and environmental groups which are 
antagonistic to business, strongly oppose changes in the current system (Stavins and 
Whitehead, 1992).
Prevailing Property Rights Regimes
Because free market environmentalism attempts to harness market forces (Stavins, 
1988), the implementation and effectiveness of incentive-based environmental 
management programs rest on the existence and efficient functioning of markets. Factors 
hampering the existence or efficient functioning of markets will also affect the 
effectiveness of incentive-based mechanisms. Fully defined, transferable, and enforceable 
property rights are a prerequisite to the existence of efficient markets. Property rights are 
constituted of separable and independent elements referring to the privileges held by the 
resource owner. In a sense, property rights are comparable to a bundle of sticks, with 
each stick representing a specific right that can be used or transferred individually 
(Daniels, 1991). For example a private landowner's set of rights can be divided into the
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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right to sell, to use, development rights, and so forth (Daniels, 1991). However, for most 
natural resources, prevailing property rights lack one or often many of the attributes 
mentioned above (Randall, 1987).
Property rights are not fully defined for a great majority of environmental 
resources. For natural resources, open access is the dominant property rights regime. 
Ambient air and ocean fishing grounds are among the many examples of natural 
resources operating under open access. Inefficiencies attached to this form of property 
rights regime are illustrated by Harding (1968) and by Gordon (1954). A mathematical 
treatment of the inefficient use of resources resulting from an open access regime is 
provided by Cheung (1970).
Rights to several environmental resources, although clearly defined, are often not 
transferable. For example, under the riparian doctrine, water rights are fully defined but 
not transferable. Lack of transferable rights does not allow resources to flow to their 
highest valued use, resulting in an inefficient allocation. Due to the non rivalry in 
consumption and/or the non exclusiveness of most natural resources, property rights are 
either very difficult or impossible to enforce. A resource is non rival if consumption by 
one individual does not decrease the amount available to remaining consumers. A 
resource is non exclusive when it is impossible to exclude individuals from using the 
resource (Randall, 1987). This enforcement difficulty may be the result of physical 
attributes of the resource (non rivalry) or societal preferences, or both (non­
exclusiveness). However, property rights structures are not static. They are dynamic in
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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nature and develop with technical changes and society's evolution (Anderson and Leal,
1991).
Research Problem: Acceptability of IBM Programs
In addition to the factors aforementioned, the acceptance of a given incentive- 
based program is critical to its success. Due to the voluntary nature of incentive-based 
programs, acceptance and thus participation in these programs is not automatic. The 
resistance to the use of markets as an environmental management tool may hamper the 
implementation of incentive-based programs. Reasons for the unwillingness to allow 
market forces in environmental resource management may stem from the strong 
ideological and political attachment to regulation existing in the U.S. (Stewart, 1988) or 
from a mistrust of market forces (Kelman, 1981). Thus, attitudes towards the use of 
markets in environmental management may play a determining role in the effective 
implementation of incentive-based management programs.
A dominant part of the social psychology literature focused on behavioral 
research has established the role of attitudes as predictors of behavior (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1988; Fazio, Powel, and Williams, 1989; Heberlein, 1989; 
Upmeyer and Six, 1989). Environmental attitudes should therefore serve as predictors 
of participation in a given incentive-based environmental management program. A better 
understanding of environmental attitudes, their formation, and translation into 
participation in a given market-based management program could facilitate a successful 
implementation of incentive-based mechanisms as alternative environment management 
strategies in agriculture.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Objectives
The overall objective of this study is to assess the role of attitudes in the decision 
making process of economic agents facing incentive-based environmental policies and 
programs.
This study has five specific objectives:
1. Develop a conceptual framework which extends the neoclassical 
economic approach to choice behavior by including psychological 
constructs;
2. To propose an appropriate behavioral model for the explanation 
of economic agents' decision to participate or not in incentive- 
based environment management programs;
3. To empirically test the model proposed, using the Wetland 
Reserve Program (WRP) in Louisiana;
4. To evaluate the relative effectiveness of two alternative attitude 
measurement approaches; and
5. Based on the conclusions of this study, to provide information to 
policy makers and environmental regulatory agencies who wish to 
use incentive-based mechanisms as an effective environmental 
management instrument to address other environmental issues in 
agriculture.
Justification
In addition to the economic incentives provided, noneconomic factors such as 
environmental attitudes may play a determining role in explaining participation in a given 
incentive-based management program. For example, Green and Hefferman (1986) 
suggest that there is a consensus among social scientists on the importance of 
noneconomic factors that farmers consider in adoption decisions for soil conservation 
practices. Similarly, landowners' acceptance has been identified as one of the key
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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determinants of the effectiveness of the Wetland Reserve Program (Danielson and Leiteh, 
1995).
Assessments of the relative efficiency of environmental attitude measurement and 
the predictive power of behavioral models based on alternative attitude measurement 
approaches have not been conducted. Furthermore, this research has not been conducted 
in the framework of participation in incentive-based environmental programs. This study 
will evaluate the measurement issues surrounding the two approaches proposed.
The Wetlands Reserve Program, which will constitute the basis for the empirical 
part of this study, is still in its early stages of implementation. The proposed behavioral 
model could provide a valuable tool to evaluate the main determinants of landowners 
decision to participate in WRP. In addition, considering the growing popularity of 
incentive-based mechanisms, implications of the model proposed could be extended to 
other incentive-based management strategies.
Procedures
The realization of the first objective of this study will rely on a review of the 
relevant and current aspects of the literature on incentive-based environmental 
management, and the role and measurement of attitudes as predictors of economic 
behavior. This study will then assess the role of attitudes in participation decisions in 
incentive-based programs by establishing a link between the bodies of literature 
reviewed.
To achieve the second objective of this study, a predictive behavioral model 
which includes an attitudinal component in a qualitative response model will be
R eproduced  with permission of the  copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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developed. Qualitative response or discrete choice models are the appropriate class of 
econometric models to use when the dependent variable is discrete and refers to a choice 
between several alternatives such as a participation choice (Greene, 1993; Judge et al, 
1985; and Amemiya, 1981). Discrete choice models have been used to describe and 
predict a wide assortment of purchasing and voting behavior, and participation decisions 
(Judge et al, 1985; Greene, 1993). The recent upsurge in the use of qualitative choice 
modeling in economic applications is due to the existence of many naturally discrete 
variables (Amemiya, 1981). Economic agents are often making choices between different 
activities rather than only making choices involving levels of participation in markets.
Qualitative response models are derived from random utility models (Greene, 
1993; Judge et al, 1982, 1988). Consider the following random utility model:
For each individual i, the utility level corresponding to the choice of alternative 
j is divided into two components. E(Uy) is the expected value of the utility level 
associated with the choice of the jth  alternative by the ith individual and e,j is a random 
error term.
Assuming a dichotomous choice model, the utility Ui0 and Uu can be expressed 
as (Judge, et al., 1988):
( 1)
U, -  U- + e. = z. ;5 + w/v + eto 10 10 to t * o to (2)
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Utility levels derived from selecting alternative 0 or alternative 1 are Ui0 and U i t , 
respectively. Vectors of alternative specific, or mode, variables are denoted by zi0' and
v a = V„ * «„ = r ,/5  * » /Y| -  (3)
Zjj1. Socio-economic characteristics of the ith choice maker are represented by w /. The 
unknown parameters are represented by 8, y0, and Yi- A rational (utility maximizing) 
individual will select alternative 1 if and only if Uu >  Ui0 or, if the latent variable y;*, 
representing the difference between the two utility levels, is positive:
y ,' = ( 2a -  Z J  6 +  w !  ( Y r Y o )  +  ( e , /  -  e io) ( 4 )
y ,' = -  z,0) • w/ i  b_ I + «/* = x/P  + e,* (5)
 ̂ Yi Yo
Thus, the probability of selecting alternative one is:
P, = Pb>t = i] = P { y - > o] = P[e;  > -x/P] (6)
For symmetric distributions, equation (6) can be written as:
Pt = 1 -  PieJ  £ -x/P] = 1 -  F(-x/P) = F(x/P) (7)
Equation (7) is the basic equation for Probit dichotomous choice models. 
Assumptions made about the distribution of the error term determine the binary choice
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model. Probit models assume normally distributed errors. F is the cumulative distribution 
function of a standard Normal (0,1) distribution.
Explanatory variables in the behavioral model proposed in this study will include 
economic variables relative to the opportunity cost of the wetland such as the average 
return per acre, relevant socio-economic factors such as income and education, wetland 
acreage owned, farm program participation, and alternative measures of environmental 
attitudes. In equations 2 to 5, economic variables and socio-economic factors are 
represented by zKl (j equal to 1 or 2) and w; , respectively.
To measure environmental attitudes, two alternative approaches will be 
considered in this study. First, environmental attitudes will be measured using Ajzen's 
theory of planned behavior (1988). For the second approach, attitude measurements will 
be based on the latest NEP Scale (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, Caton, and Howell,
1992). The use of alternative methods to assess environmental attitudes will allow 
comparison of the relative efficiency of environmental attitude measurements and 
evaluation of the relative predictive power of behavioral models based on the two 
approaches.
The third objective constitutes the empirical part of this study. This study will use 
primary data collected by surveying private land owners meeting the eligibility criteria 
for participation in the Wetland Reserve Program in Louisiana. Government policies 
have shifted from giving economic incentives for wetland conversion to giving economic 
incentives for restoring and protecting wetlands. Enacted in 1990, the Wetland Reserve 
Program is the latest policy instrument aimed at preserving wetlands. Under the
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provisions of the WRP, the government is authorized to "purchase easements from 
owners of eligible land who voluntarily agree to restore and protect farmed wetlands and 
eligible adjacent acres" (USDA, 1992).
Louisiana was one of the eight pilot states selected to participate in the first phase 
of the WRP, and one of 19 states participating in the second phase of WRP sign-ups. 
Under the WRP, USDA purchases permanent easements from participating wetlands 
owners offering farmed wetlands, prior converted wetlands, and riparian areas linking 
wetlands (Coreil, 1994 a). The USDA pays landowners a fair market value for the 
enrolled acreage and up to 75 percent of the costs of wetland restoration to approved 
wetland conditions. Under the supervision of the Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service (ASCS), the enrolled acreage must be kept in a permanent wetland 
condition in perpetuity (Coreil, 1994 b).
Because it relies on voluntary participation of landowners and offers economic 
incentives, i.e., cash payments, instead of setting regulatory standards, the WRP is an 
incentive-based environmental management program. Under the WRP, a portion of 
private property rights, i.e., the development rights are transferred from landowners to 
the government. In design, the WRP is similar to previous state level land use programs 
which separated use and development rights. Thus, the acceptance of this market-based 
program might be influenced by environmental attitudes, especially those towards 
property rights of natural resources.
Data for the estimation of the proposed empirical model will be obtained from a 
mail survey using a modification of the Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman, 1991).
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The questionnaire will focus on eliciting the determinants of environmental attitudes 
relevant to participation in the Wetland Reserve Program. Names and addresses for the 
sample will be obtained from the Louisiana NRCS, which administers the Louisiana 
WRP and conducts WRP enrollment. A sample from the approximately 500 names of 
wetland owners who offered intentions during the two sign-up periods (1992, 1994, 
1995) will be supplemented with a matching sample of wetland owners who did not offer 
wetlands for enrollment in the WRP, obtained from the Louisiana Cooperative Extension 
Service.
Objective four will by achieved by evaluating the relative predictive power of 
behavioral models containing an attitudinal component measured either via the NEP 
approach or via the social psychology approach. This evaluation will be done by 
comparing different goodness of fit criteria.
Objective five will be achieved through a generalization of findings resulting from 
the previous objectives to environmental management programs adopting an incentive- 
based approach. Results will be interpreted in light of the information needs of policy 
makers and wetlands owners. This research should shed needed light on the determinants 
of voluntary participation in incentive-based environmental management, as well as 
provide a better understanding of the role of environmental attitudes in that decision 
process.
Summary
In summary, this research proposes to evaluate the role of environmental attitudes 
in incentive-based environmental management programs in agriculture by developing a
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predictive behavioral model which incorporates alternative attitudinal measures in a 
qualitative response model. Primary data collected through a mail survey of private 
wetland owners will be used to empirically test the model proposed. In addition, the 
relative predictive power of behavioral models based on the alternative attitude 
measurement approaches considered in the study will be evaluated.
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CHAPTER 2
INCENTIVE-BASED MECHANISMS AND THE WETLAND 
RESERVE PROGRAM
Either as complements or as alternatives to the traditional command and control 
approach, incentive-based mechanisms are increasingly gaining recognition as suitable 
environmental management tools. Incentive-based strategies are also increasingly 
included in agriculture related environmental policies such as soil conservation programs 
and wetland preservation or restoration. Following a brief presentation of the theoretical 
basis and applications of incentive-based mechanisms, and an overview of the history of 
soil conservation in the United States, the Wetland Reserve Program will be 
characterized in terms of an incentive-based program.
Incentive-Based Mechanisms
Incentive-based mechanisms or market-based incentives are environmental 
management tools that rely on a system of economic rewards (positive incentives) or 
penalties (disincentives) to promote a desired behavior or discourage a given externality 
generating activity. For this reason, incentive-based mechanisms are also referred to as 
economic instruments which can direct private actions towards socially desirable 
behavior (Opschoor and Vos, 1989). Market forces, not bureaucratic decisions, are the 
driving elements in this form of environmental management. Though some authors 
suggest more detailed classifications (Opschoor and Vos, 1989; Fiorino, 1995), 
incentive-based mechanisms can be divided into two basic categories: transferable 
permits and taxes and subsidies (Field, 1994).
17
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Transferable Permits
The concept of transferable or marketable permits is due to Dales (1968). Under 
a transferable permit system, the environmental regulatory agency first determines the 
maximum allowable level of the externality generating activity, i.e., sets standards, and 
then issues the corresponding amount of permits. This system creates a new type of 
property right (Field, 1994). The right to engage in the externality generating activity, 
which was initially accessible to all, becomes exclusive, completely specified, and 
transferable. The regulatory agency creates an artificial market for the trade of permits 
(Fiorino, 1995).
Initially, permits can be either distributed among participants in the externality 
generating activity or sold at an auction to the highest bidders (Freeman, 1994). The 
initial mode of permit distribution can affect the competitiveness of the industry 
responsible for the externality generating activity considered. By distributing the initial 
number of permits among the existing participants or firms, the regulatory agency makes 
it more difficult for future participants to enter the industry. In effect, this mode of 
distribution creates additional barriers to entry and thus, decreases the competitiveness 
of the industry. This problem can be avoided if the regulatory agency sets aside a certain 
portion of the permits for future participants in the activity or industry in question. 
Auctioning off the permits can give an unfair advantage to larger firms or participants 
with more financial resources. As a strategic plan, they can buy as many permits as 
possible in order to control the industry and gain market power by driving competitors 
away.
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While the supply of permits is predetermined and independent of prices, the 
demand for permits is a function of the number of participants and of the marginal 
abatement curve of the damage resulting from the externality generating activity. Figure 
1 illustrates the supply and demand for marketable permit systems, the effects on permit 
prices of new participants, and of a reduction in the number of permits. Because the 
quantity of permits (Q*) is predetermined, the supply of permits (S) is vertical. The 
optimal price of permits (P*) is determined by the equilibrium which is the intersection 
(E*) between the supply and the demand (D) curves. To improve environmental quality 
in a designated area, the regulatory agency can decrease the number of permits in 
circulation to Q' by buying back and retiring a given number of permits. Such a decision 
would lead to a shift in the supply of permits from S to S'. The resulting equilibrium 
and price are respectively E' and p '. If new participants were to enter the market for 
tradable permits, the demand curve would shift to D1 and the new equilibrium and price 
would be E '' and p " , respectively. A reduction in the number of permits as well as an 
increase in the demand for permits will lead to an increase in permit prices.
Another way of gaining access to tradeable credits or authorizations for engaging 
in the externality generating activity is through reducing one's level of externality 
generated below a preset threshold (Tietenberg, 1992). The only difference between these 
credits and the permits previously discussed is that the supply for these credits is price 
responsive. The higher the price of credits, the more incentives one has to reduce his 
own level of externality generated in order to sell the additional credits earned.






Figure 1. Tradable Permit System 
Source: Pearce and Turner, 1990
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In the United States, air pollution control has so far constituted the most fertile 
domain of application of marketable permit systems. For example, the Emission Reduction 
Credit (ERC) Program, which allows limited emission permit trading for stationary 
sources, was authorized under provisions of the Clean Air Act of 1977. Offsets, bubbles, 
banking, and netting are the four specific subprograms that constitute the ERC program 
(Dudek and Palmisano, 1988). Overall, the ERC program has yielded significant 
compliance cost reductions estimated at over $10 billion (Tietenberg, 1992). Created by 
the Clean Air Act of 1990, the transferable discharge permit program (TDP) for sulfur 
dioxide emissions offers another example of the application of marketable permits to air 
pollution control (Fiorino, 1995). Fisheries management constitutes another domain of 
application of tradable permit systems. Individual transferable quotas (ITQs), which are 
well defined authorizations to catch a certain amount of fish under clearly specified 
conditions, have been used in managing several fishing grounds worldwide (Neher, 
Amason, and Mollet, 1989). Other applications of tradable permit systems as 
environmental management instruments in the United States include the control of the lead 
content of gasoline and the trade of water pollution rights (Carlin, 1992).
Taxes and Subsidies
The use of taxes and subsidies as environmental management tools was first 
introduced more than 75 years ago by Pigou (1920) who suggested that taxes and subsidies 
were adequate means to curb or promote targeted activities. A Pigouvian tax is a 
corrective tax imposed to discourage activities creating negative externalities (Hahn and 
Stavins, 1992). The optimal Pigouvian tax (subsidy) corresponding to a given externality
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generating activity has to be equal to the socially optimal marginal damage (benefit) level. 
In other terms, the optimal level of taxation is achieved when the tax is set where the 
marginal net benefit derived from the activity considered is equal to zero. For a given 
activity, the marginal net benefit is the difference between the marginal benefit and the 
marginal damage produced by the activity. The imposition of an optimal Pigouvian tax 
would result in a Pareto-efficient level of the externality generating activity (Baumol and 
Oates, 1992).
The graphical determination of the optimal level of a Pigouvian tax is illustrated 
in Figure 2. Socially optimal levels of the externality generating activity Q* and the 
corresponding Pigouvian tax are determined at the equilibrium E, which is the point of 
intersection between the marginal benefit and marginal damage curves. Total revenues 
raised by the government are represented by the area O t* E Q*. For a given 
environmental damage, the large number of externality generating activities involved and 
persons affected by the damage make the calculation of the money value of the marginal 
benefit and marginal damage schedules very difficult. Thus, the correct determination of 
the optimal Pigouvian tax is practically impossible (Dubgaard, 1994).
The pricing and standard approach offers a workable alternative to the optimal 
Pigouvian tax. This system is an hybrid between the direct regulatory and the incentive- 
based approaches. Under this system, acceptable levels of damages, i.e., quality standards, 
are initially determined by the regulatory agency. Then, an appropriate tax level is selected 
to meet the preset targets. Though this method will generally not result in a Pareto-optimal





Figure 2. Optimal Pigouvian Tax 
Source: adapted from Fields, 1994.
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level of the externality generating activity, it is the most efficient way to meet the 
predetermined environmental quality standards (Baumol and Oates, 1992).
Charges or taxes and subsidies have been applied to a wide variety of externality 
generating activities to modify behavior, raise revenues or both. According to a survey 
study conducted by Opschoor and Vos, revenue raising has been the primary objective of 
most environmental taxes (1989). Taxes can be applied either to inputs or raw materials 
or directly to the externality generated such as the pollutant or effluent. Taxes on 
fertilizers based on their nitrogen content constitute an example of environmental taxes 
applied to the externality generating inputs or equipment (Field, 1994). Taxes based on 
the level of externality generated, also referred to as effluent charges or emission taxes, 
have been mainly used in water pollution control and noise reduction strategies (Opschoor 
and Vos, 1989).
Incentive-based mechanisms that simultaneously use a tax and a subsidy are typified 
by deposit-refimd schemes. Under such systems, a tax is initially levied when the product 
is purchased and a subsidy is paid when parts or the entire used product is returned at 
specified collection centers (Field, 1994). Returns are either recycled or properly disposed. 
Beverage and pesticide containers, lead acid batteries (Anderson, Hoffman, and Rusin, 
990), lubricating oil, and cars (Field, 1994) are among the many examples of deposit 
refund schemes currently used.
Despite their theoretical attractiveness, taxes are not widespread. The difficulty in 
accurately evaluating damage functions, the inherent resistance to change by regulators, 
and the uncertainty about the justice of Pigouvian taxes have been identified as factors
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limiting the use of taxes as environmental management instruments (Pierce and Turner, 
1990). Furthermore, there exists in the United States an inherent opposition to new taxes 
regardless of their objectives. The uniform taxation of every unit of externality generated 
results in total tax payments that are significantly larger than the damage caused. A 
corrective method suggested by Field (1994) calls for a two-part tax which would tax only 
a part of the externality generated.
Soil Conservation and Land Use Policies in the United States
The evolution of soil conservation and land use policies in the United States 
illustrates the pivotal role that economic compensation has always played and the 
unrecognized contribution of incentive-based programs. The following sections provide 
an historical overview of soil conservation and land use policies.
History of Soil Conservation and Land Use Policies
Earliest documented efforts to promote soil conservation in the United States were 
the result of localized actions of farmers or politicians such as Jefferson. The foundations 
for a national soil conservation program were set by Hugh H. Bennett, a USDA soil 
scientist who was the first individual to emphasize that soil erosion was not a localized 
concern of some isolated landowners but a national problem demanding national 
institutions and solutions (Rasmussen, 1982). Following Bennett's assessment of the scope 
of soil erosion in the U.S., the Soil Erosion Service (SES), which later became the Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS), was created in 1933. The Soil Conservation Service is known 
today as the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS).
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During the more than 60 years that conservation programs have been implemented, 
successes have been relatively limited. For example, only a fourth of the U.S. farmland 
was enrolled in approved soil conservation practices (Wittwer, 1978). The National 
Agricultural Research and Extension Users Advisory Board also noted the excessive rate 
of loss of agricultural lands and soils and suggested that USDA concentrated on improving 
the effectiveness of soil and land conservation programs (Rasmussen, 1982).
The objectives of soil conservation programs have evolved over time with changes 
in the political and economic environment and have included a variety of goals such as 
farmers' income support, mitigation of soil erosion, water quality amelioration, flood 
control, and general environmental quality improvement. Nevertheless, the design and 
structure of most current soil conservation policies are not fundamentally different from 
initial programs established in the early 1930's (Batie, 1985) which relied on a system of 
passive incentives.
Alternative Policy Approaches
The soil conservation programs and land use policies implemented to date have 
used one of three major approaches: self regulation, cross compliance programs, and 
incentive-based mechanisms. These different approaches to soil conservation mainly differ 
from one another by their selected enforcement means. Under the self regulatory approach 
to agricultural policy relative to soil conservation, unconditional support of farmers' 
income and productivity maintenance were the main goals of most programs and policies. 
Soil conservation solely relied on farmers' willingness to participate in proposed programs 
or adopt suggested practices. Without restrictions, farmers were able to enjoy all benefits
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provided by income support and commodity programs. In contrast, cross compliance 
conservation strategies have provided income support conditional on participating in 
specific programs or adopting given practices. Incentive-based mechanisms have relied on 
a system of economic rewards and penalties to promote environment improvement.
Self-Regulatorv Approach
The self-regulatory status granted to agriculture can be traced back to agricultural 
fundamentalists who believed that farmers and their lifestyle were one of the cornerstones 
of American society and thus, had to be protected at all cost. This approach relies on 
voluntarism which has constituted a fundamental principle of soil conservation in the U.S. 
(Crosson, 1984). Voluntarism encourages farmers to undertake soil conservation while 
maintaining a complete independence between conservation participation decisions and 
eligibility for government benefits. A fanner's decision not to engage in conservation 
practices does not in anyway compromise his eligibility for government programs. Early 
legislative acts such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and programs derived 
from it provide examples o f soil conservation programs based on voluntarism.
Although the Soil Conservation Act of 1935 clearly identified soil erosion as a 
national threat and recommended that farmers and government cooperate to mitigate soil 
erosion, supporting farmers' income and maintaining farmland productivity were the 
primary goals of the early legislation passed and programs implemented. For example, 
while its declared goal was soil conservation, the support of farmers' income by reducing 
crop surpluses was the specific goal of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act 
of 1936. Soil conservation was just an accessory used as a protective umbrella against the
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Supreme Court which previously had ruled that plans to regulate agricultural production 
such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 were unconstitutional (Rasmussen, 
1982). Under the provisions of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 
farmers were offered financial incentives through the Agricultural Conservation Program 
(ACP) to shift agricultural land from "soil depleting" to "soil conserving" crops. Soil 
depleting crops corresponded to crops for which surpluses existed (Bade, 1985).
Voluntarism was a justifiable approach while maintaining farmland's productivity 
and farmers' income were the primary goals of soil conservation policies (Crosson, 1984). 
However, it became an increasingly questionable conservation approach as society began 
to recognize the important role agriculture plays in environmental degradation. 
Furthermore, due to the continuing decline in political power of farmers and their 
representatives and the maturing of the environmental movement, agricultural policy, 
including soil conservation programs and land use policies, was under increased scrutiny 
(Bade, 1985). The following reevaluadon of society's "contract with agriculture" resulted 
in a policy shift demanding more accountability from farmers receiving government 
benefits. More specifically, soil conservation policies evolved from unconditional 
maintenance of farmland productivity and unrestricted support of farmers’ income to cross 
compliance programs.
Cross-Compliance Approach
Cross compliance programs, also referred to as carrot and stick methods, use either 
"green ticket" or "red ticket" approaches. The green ticket approach promises additional 
benefits such as higher price support payments to landowners who agree to implement
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predetermined conservation practices. The red ticket approach threatens to deny benefits 
previously acquired to landowners who do not implement soil conservation practices 
(Kramer and Batie, 1985). The Soil Bank, Sodbuster and Swampbuster Programs 
constitute examples of programs relying on the cross compliance approach to soil 
conservation.
The Soil Bank Program, which was established by the Agricultural Act of 1956, 
offers an example of a conservation program mainly aimed at supporting farmers' income 
but with a cross compliance component (Kramer, and Batie; 1985). The Soil Bank 
Program was a short lived attempt to support farmers' income by withdrawing agricultural 
land from production. Acreage reserve and conservation reserve were the two components 
of the program. The acreage reserve component gave farmers incentives to decrease their 
total acreage of allotment crops which were wheat, com, cotton, peanuts, tobacco, and 
rice. The conservation reserve element promoted conservation through providing 
incentives to withdraw land from production for up to 10 years (Rasmussen, 1985).
While the Soil Bank Program used a carrot or green ticket approach, the following 
generation of cross compliance programs such as the Sodbuster and Swampbuster relied 
on a stick or red ticket approach. Instead of offering benefits in exchange for participation 
in soil conservation programs, the Sodbuster and Swampbuster programs denied benefits 
to farmers who did not adopt suggested practices. Both programs were established under 
the conservation title or Title XII of the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills.
The Sodbuster and Swampbuster Programs are attempts to correct some 
inconsistencies of federal agricultural policies. Through commodity programs, agricultural
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policy has given farmers strong financial incentives to crop as many acres as they can, 
including highly erodible land and wetlands. Simultaneously, several programs promote 
soil conservation and the preservation of the same highly erodible land and wetlands.
Under the provisions of the Sodbuster, a farmer loses all commodity program 
benefits if he crops highly erodible land which was not cropped before 1985. For highly 
erodible land that has been in production before 1985, the adoption and implementation 
of adequate conservation practices are required from farmers wanting to remain eligible 
for federal programs (National Wildlife Federation, 1994).
Besides the fact that it is aimed at wetland preservation and restoration, the 
Swampbuster Program is similar in design to the Sodbuster Program. Provisions of the 
initial Swampbuster deny a series of federal benefits to farmers who drain wetlands and 
transform them into agricultural land. The list of federal benefits denied includes price 
supports, farm storage facility loans, disaster payments, and commodity credit payments. 
Subsequently, the Swampbuster provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill denied benefits to 
farmers who drain wetlands regardless of the projected use of the land (National Wildlife 
Federation, 1994). Since its inception, the Swampbuster has significantly participated in 
slowing down the rate of wetland conversions to agriculture. However, the effectiveness 
of the Swampbuster provisions has been somewhat limited by the excessive number of 
exemptions granted (McElfish and Adler, 1990).
Cross compliance programs constitute a marked improvement from the 
voluntarism-based approach that was prevailing earlier in soil conservation policy (Steiner, 
1990). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of cross compliance programs is contingent on
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farmers participation in federal income support and commodity programs Furthermore, 
the cross compliance approach to soil conservation policy has shortcomings that are similar 
to those of the direct regulatory approach. For instance, enforcement and monitoring of 
compliance requirements are difficult and very expensive. The revived interest in the 
incentive-based approach has provided the next generation of policy instruments to further 
conservation goals and remedy some of the limitations of the previous approaches.
Incentive-based Approach
Historically, economic incentives have played a central role in U.S. land use and 
soil conservation policies. Nevertheless, few have recognized the different incentive-based 
mechanisms that have been used. In land use policies, examples of incentive-based 
mechanisms include state and local level management programs with transferable 
development rights (TDRs) or allowing the purchase of development rights (PDRs). The 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) 
meanwhile illustrate the use of market-based incentives in federal soil conservation 
policies.
State and Local Level Programs
Economic development and the rapid expansion of many cities have been exerting 
continuous pressures on agricultural land. It is estimated that every year, one million acres 
of prime agricultural farmland is lost to urbanization in the United States (Blewett and 
Lane, 1988). Public concerns over the steady decline in America’s agricultural land 
prompted private environmental groups and state and local governments to consider 
several farmland retention and open space protection programs.
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Five major techniques have been used to preserve farmland and open space. State 
and local governments have relied on zoning laws, the outright purchase of the land, the 
transference, and the purchase of development rights. Private groups such as land trusts 
and national environmental organizations have participated in farmland and open space 
preservation by acquiring development rights mainly through conservation easements 
which are landowners donations (Wright, 1994).
The simplest and most direct way to prevent farmland conversion is the fee simple 
purchase of the land considered. However, the expensiveness of this type of policy renders 
it in most cases difficult to implement. For example, Boulder and Boulder County, 
Colorado spent 85 million dollars to buy 50 thousands acres of farmland (Wright, 1993). 
Zoning laws, which are policy instruments for land use management by direct regulation, 
simply forbid agricultural land conversion in specified areas. Their inherent reversibility 
(Toner, 1984), perceived unfairness to landowners, and potential for litigation are 
identified as some of the shortcomings of zoning laws (Wright, 1994; Daniels, 1991). 
Transfers and purchases of development rights constitute alternative policy instruments to 
the regulatory approach of zoning laws and to the expensive cost of direct purchase of the 
land. The transference and purchase of development rights are based on the separability 
of the bundle of rights associated with land ownership (Luzar and Batie, 1986). Transfers 
and purchases of development rights are incentive-based instruments for long term 
farmland retention strategies which allow landowners' compensation for restrictions placed 
on their property.
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Under a development right transfer system, "sending" and "receiving" areas for 
development rights are identified. Interested parties can buy development rights from 
landowners in designated conservation areas, i.e., sending areas, and use them in receiving 
areas or locations that have been pre-approved for development (Wright, 1994). Though 
they have been extensively discussed, transfers of development rights have not often been 
used in farmland retention programs (Roddenwig and Ingrahm, 1987). The total acreage 
of agricultural land conserved through development right transfer schemes has been 
estimated at 36 thousand acres (Wright, 1994). With 24 thousands acres of farmland 
protected via TDRs, Montgomery County in Maryland has developed the most important 
TDR program in the United States (Mantell, Harper, and Propst, 1990). TDRs have also 
been used for the conservation of ecologically sensitive areas, the provision of low cost 
housing, and the preservation of heritage items (Bindon, 1992). Development rights 
transfer programs have been found to be cumbersome to administrate and difficult to 
explain (Wright, 1994).
More straightforward than the transfer of development rights, purchase of 
development rights programs buy limited rights, which are called easements, to preserve 
agricultural land (Buist et al., 1995). A PDR program is a farmland retention technique 
that purchases, separately, the development rights of the land (Luzar and Batie, 1986). In 
the United States, the first county level PDR program was implemented in Suffolk County, 
New York (Daniels, 1991). Though there has not been a single PDR program in the 
southeastern part of the U.S. until 1985 (Luzar and Batie, 1986), the use of PDRs as a 
farmland retention policy has been growing in popularity in recent years. By 1991, PDRs
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helped preserve 205,000 acres of agricultural farmland in 11 states at a cost of $400 
million (Daniels, 1991). To date, 15 states or their counties have implemented PDR 
programs (Buist, et al., 1995). With approximately 80,000 acres protected, Maryland has 
been the leading state in establishing PDR systems. Because they provide economic 
compensation, and, in contrast to zoning laws, are voluntary in nature, PDRs are well 
accepted by landowners (Daniels, 1991). In keeping with the policy intent, development 
of an agricultural land under a PDR system is permanently restricted (Wright, 1994).
In summary, PDR programs provide fair compensation to landowners, are flexible, 
voluntary, and permanent. However, despite their potential benefits, the establishment of 
PDR programs is hampered by the high cost of purchasing development rights (Luzar and 
Batie, 1986; Daniels, 1991). For example, in King County, Washington, initial 
development rights purchases have cost up to $8,000 an acre (Daniels, 1991). With the 
exception of few counties such as King County, Washington and Suffolk County, New 
York, few localities can afford extensive PDR programs (Wright, 1994).
Federal Programs
With the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills, the concept of purchasing development rights 
has been revived. PDRs evolved from state and local level policy instruments to federal 
environmental management tools. More specifically, the Conservation Reserve Program 
and the Wetlands Reserve Program are federal purchase of development right schemes 
aimed at preserving highly erodible lands and wetlands, respectively.
The Conservation Reserve Program was created in the Farm Bill of 1985 and offers 
compensation to farmers who refrain from planting on highly erodible land. A given land’s
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eligibility for enrollment in the CRP is determined by its credibility index and soil loss 
tolerance level (Shoemaker, 1989). The CRP also requires that contract holders establish 
a permanent vegetative cover on the enrolled farmland. Fifty percent of the cost of 
establishing the permanent cover is borne by the USDA (Luzar, 1988). The agreement 
between the farmer and the former ASCS, which was administering the program, is 
temporary and can last up to 10 years.
Since the creation of the CRP, a total of 36 million acres of farmland have been 
enrolled. The Conservation Reserve Program has significantly participated in reducing 
cropland erosion in the U.S. (Dodson and McElroy, 1995). In addition, the CRP has 
resulted in a marked increase in the number of farmers concerned about soil conservation 
(Zinn, 1993). The CRP has also yielded several benefits to farmers including higher 
farmland prices (Shoemaker, 1989) and higher crop prices resulting from the acreage idled 
(Dodson and McElroy, 1995).
As a policy instrument, the temporary feature of the CRP constitutes one of its 
major drawbacks. Enrollment contracts for about 22 million acres will expire by 1997. 
According to a 1993 survey conducted by the Soil and Water Conservation Society, 63 
percent of contract holders plan to return their farmland to production once their contracts 
have expired (Collins, 1995). Thus, more than 13 million acres of highly erodible land 
will be returned to production in the next three years, creating the same problem the CRP 
was initially supposed to solve. The Wetlands Reserve Program, which was designed at 
a later date, accounted for this shortcoming.
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Traditionally, wetlands have been considered either as a source of nuisance and 
disease (Carey, Heimlich, and Brazee, 1990) or as obstacles to more profitable uses of the 
land (Wiebe, and Heimlich, 1995). Better information on their multiple roles and 
assessments of the benefits they provide led to a shift in public attitudes towards wetlands 
and prompted changes in government polices (Heimlich, 1991). According to the Section 
404 permit program and the Swampbuster provision, wetlands can be broadly defined as 
"hydric soil that normally supports water-loving (hydrophytic) vegetation” (Carey, 
Heimlich, and Brazee, 1990, p.2). However, what constitutes a wetland is still a 
controversial matter. So far, a consensus on a single definition has not been reached.
Benefits derived from wetlands include the provision of habitat for threatened and 
endangered species, water quality improvement, soil erosion reduction, and flood 
prevention. Wetlands also provide spawning grounds for 60 to 90 percent of the nation's 
commercial fisheries catches. In Louisiana, where approximatively 40 percent of the 
nation's coastal wetlands are located (Bergstrom and Stoll, 1990), wetlands also serve as 
the foundation for its marine fishery and related economic activities including finfish, 
oyster, and shrimp harvests. Moreover, as a multi-attribute resource, wetlands offer a 
wide assortment of recreational activities such as waterfowl hunting and saltwater fishing 
(Gan and Luzar, 1993).
From promoting wetland conversion and drainage, government policies have 
evolved to giving economic incentives for wetlands preservation and restoration (Buist, 
1993, Hamilton, 1994). The Wetland Reserve Program is the latest policy instrument 
directed towards wetlands protection. WRP adapts to wetlands the concept of purchase of
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development rights that has been used since the 1970s in farmland retention and open 
space preservation.
Although not commonly recognized as such, programs allowing the purchase of 
development rights and derived variations such as the Wetlands Reserve Program are 
incentive-based mechanisms. Under these systems, landowners are fully compensated for 
the restrictions placed on their resources. In addition, society, which constitutes the 
ultimate beneficiary of the imposed restrictions, is the one who pays for it. For programs 
such as WRP, the use of “conservation easements leaves the property in private 
ownership and available for other compatible economic uses while placing responsibility 
for funding on the public which reaps most of the benefits" (Hamilton 1994, p .118). The 
Wetland Reserve Program meets the criteria, identified by Opschoor and Vos (1989), that 
allow one to classify a policy instrument as an environmental incentive-based mechanism. 
The four criteria selected are "the existence of financial stimuli, the possibility of 
voluntary action, the involvement of government or related authorities, and, the intention 
of directly or indirectly preserving or improving environmental quality by applying the 
instrument" (Opschoor and Vos, 1989, p. 14). Participation in the Wetland Reserve 
Program is voluntary, the government is involved through the soil conservation agencies 
that administer the program, the program offers financial compensation to landowners, and 
the goal of the program is to improve environmental quality by protecting and restoring 
wetlands.
Derived from county and state-level purchases of development rights, programs 
such as the Wetland Reserve Program are incentive-based environmental management
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instruments. According to Coreil (1995), the WRP is a private landowner-oriented 
incentive-based program. Because they were not previously considered as such, incentive- 
based soil conservation policies like the Wetland Reserve Program do not readily fit in 
taxation (subsidization) schemes or tradeable permit systems, the two categories of 
incentive-based mechanisms defined earlier. However, the purchase of development rights 
and its recent extensions to soil conservation (CRP) and wetlands preservation and 
restoration (WRP) can be classified as incentive-based programs using tradable rights. In 
this broader class of incentive-based mechanisms, the rights to be privately owned and 
traded include all the marketable permits aforementioned (emission credits and permits, 
individual transferable quotas) and development rights whether used in a PDR scheme or 
traded for wetland conservation and restoration purposes. Therefore, the two broad 
categories of incentive-based mechanisms can be redefined as tradable rights and taxes and 
subsidies. Through the trading of development rights, conservation programs such as the 
WRP are incentive-based instruments because they "effectively create a market for 
remaining and restorable wetlands" (Wiebe, and Heimlich, 1995, p. 13).
Summary
Incentive-based mechanisms do not constitute a panacea (Steward, 1988, 
Tietenberg, 1992) but they usually offer a workable alternative to efficiently control 
environmentally damaging activities. In many cases, the workable policy alternative is a 
combination of regulation and incentive-based mechanisms. Soil conservation and land 
use policies have evolved over time and have recently taken an incentive-based approach
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to deal with issues such as agricultural farmland retention and wetland preservation and 
restoration.
Participation in voluntary programs may be influenced by a variety of factors, 
including traditional economic concerns, socio-economic characteristics, and 
psychographic factors. In the case of the WRP, because these programs are voluntary in 
nature, landowners' environmental attitudes might have an important role in explaining 
and predicting landowners' participation decisions. As a prerequisite to assessing the 
potential role of environmental attitudes in participation decisions, the following chapter 
will review alternative behavior evaluation approaches, including the traditional 
neoclassical economic and psychological economic frameworks.
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CHAPTER 3
ALTERNATIVE BEHAVIOR EVALUATION APPROACHES
The evaluation, explanation, and prediction of human behavior have long been of 
prime interest to many scientists, especially social scientists. Depending on the discipline 
considered, individuals' decision making and behavior have been evaluated and predicted 
using a variety of paradigms and theories. Different social sciences rely on different sets 
of tools to analyze decision makers’ behavior.
In economics, most individual decision making and behavior are explained within 
the neoclassical paradigm by some form of constrained optimization. Generally, profits 
or utility are the quantities to optimize under a given set of restrictions or constraints 
such as income. In a sense, economics considers decision makers as isolated maximizing 
(or minimizing) entities who base their decisions solely on economic considerations. Other 
social sciences rely on very different tools to explain and predict individual behavior. For 
example, disciplines like sociology, anthropology, and social psychology use means such 
as predispositions, socio-cultural environment, and attitudes towards the behavior 
considered as possible explanatory instruments.
Economics and psychology are among the main social sciences dealing with human 
behavior. Though economics and psychology have both originated from a common body 
of philosophical concepts (Hogarth and Reder, 1987), they evolved into very different 
disciplines following divergent paths. Differences between economics and psychology 
include the scope of the object of research, the data considered relevant (Hogarth and
40
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Reder, 1987) and the investigative approach adopted (MacFayden and MacFayden, 1986). 
This study considers economic and social psychology approaches to evaluating and 
predicting behavior and proposes a synthesis of the two approaches via the inclusion of 
psychological variables in qualitative choice economic models.
The following section summarize the principal economic approach to behavior 
evaluation. Next, alternative economic approaches are reviewed. Finally, required 
characteristics of the social psychology perspective selected for the behavioral model of 
participation in conservation programs such as the Wetland Reserve Program are 
presented.
Economic Approaches to Behavior
Neoclassical Approach
The neoclassical economics paradigm, which is the dominant paradigm in 
contemporary economics, considers each individual decision maker as a "bundle of 
motivating preferences, combined with some procedures to translate these preferences into 
social acts" (Bausor, 1988, p. 12). Decision makers are assumed to be rational, isolated, 
and maximizing individuals. In this context, decisions are viewed as resulting from a 
careful evaluation process during which all the available relevant information is analyzed. 
Economic Rationality
Rationality is a key concept in neoclassical economics but its definition is subjected 
to different interpretations. Some authors suggest that economics attaches different 
meanings to the concept of rationality. For example, Hogarth and Reder (1987) argue that 
neoclassical economics offers two complementary definitions of the concept of rationality.
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The first approach provides a broad definition of rationality and is extensively 
discussed in most consumer theory and microeconomics treatises. From this perspective, 
rationality is defined as a conceptual framework. This conceptual framework is generally 
referred to as the "rational choice paradigm." For economists, an individual decision 
maker's behavior is consistent with the rational choice paradigm if and only if her 
behavior "is in accordance with a systematic set of preferences" (Green, 1978, p.22).
Rational economic behavior is assumed to rest on three fundamental axioms. The 
axioms are mathematical translations of the assumptions made about how people behave 
(Robinson et al, 1984). Axiom one is often referred to as the completeness axiom. The 
completeness axiom establishes that there is a preference ordering for any pair of 
alternatives A and B drawn from a given set of alternatives. In other words, the decision 
maker prefers A to B, or B to A, or is indifferent between them (Green, 1978). The 
transitivity axiom is the second axiom on which the rational behavior paradigm rests. It 
deals with the consistency of the decision maker's preference ordering of more than two 
alternatives. The transitivity axiom ensures that, given three alternatives A, B, and C, if 
A is preferred to B, and B is prefered to C, then A must be prefered to C (Green, 1978). 
The third axiom, or rational choice axiom, establishes that if A is selected from a set of 
alternatives, then A must be at least as good as any other alternative drawn from the same 
set. As Green (1978) points out, this axiom is incomplete because it does not allow us to 
determine how an alternative was selected from a set of equivalent choices.
For practical purposes and further analyses of individual decision making in 
economics, the rational choice paradigm is replaced with the more precise definition of
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economic rationality that is provided by the utility maximization approach. Four additional 
axioms are necessary in order to use the utility maximization approach, and thug derive 
testable hypotheses about individual decision makers' choices. This narrower and more 
precise concept of economic rationality is centered around individuals' utility functions. 
The concept of utility, which is attributed to Bernoulli (1738), refers to the level of 
satisfaction derived by an individual from consuming a given bundle of goods or engaging 
in an activity (Pindick and Rubinfield, 1992). A utility function is a mathematical function 
that allows the ranking of different alternatives available to an individual. An important 
feature of utility functions is that they only allow ordinal ranking of alternatives, i.e., they 
are uniquely defined only up to an order-preserving or monotonic transformation 
(Nicholson, 1985).
The fourth axiom, or non-satiation axiom, can be simply stated as more is preferred 
to less. Remaining axioms deal with desirable mathematical properties of indifference 
curves and of the underlying utility function. Axiom five establishes the continuity of 
preferences. For any two alternatives x and x’ on the boundary set B(x), the decision 
maker is indifferent between x and x’. Because each boundary set, or indifference curve, 
represents one and only one level of satisfaction or utility, boundary sets are parallel and 
thus, do not intersect. The sixth axiom refers to the strict convexity of boundary sets. 
Axiom six makes the assumption that indifference curves are smoothly convex to the 
origin (Green, 1978). The regular strict quasi-concavity of the underlying utility function 
is a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of axiom six. The seventh and last axiom deals 
with the smoothness of the indifference curves. It states that along any boundary set, the
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marginal rate of substitution has to be uniquely defined. Presentations of the complete set 
of axioms, including formal statements of the axioms, graphical illustrations, and the 
derivation of relevant corollaries to these axioms are provided by Green (1978) and Varian 
(1992).
Rational Economic Man
The seven axioms required for the theory of utility maximization provide the 
foundation for the formulation of the concept of Rational Economic Man (REM) or Homo 
economicus. Rational economic man constitutes a central feature of most economic 
analyses. As defined by MacFayden (1986, p.25), REM is a "selfish utility maximizer who 
makes completely efficient use of available information in order to select the most highly 
valued position open to him/her." As Simon (1987) suggests, rational economic man 
always makes the decision that is objectively, or substantively, the most profitable for a 
given utility function. Traditional neoclassical economics also assumes that REM's pursuit 
of the highest level of satisfaction achievable to him takes place within given and static 
social and institutional frameworks (Wolff and Resnick, 1987).
The notion of rational economic man and its underlying theoretical foundation, i.e ., 
the theory of utility maximization, have significantly contributed to the development of 
explanatory and predictive models of human decision making processes. Furthermore, the 
axiomatic basis of these concepts has provided economics with a methodological rigor and 
conceptual cohesiveness that is lacking in many other social sciences, including psychology 
and social psychology (Hey, 1987; Hogarth and Reder, 1987). The relative success of the 
utility maximization approach has led neoclassical economists to address behavior and
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choices considered outside traditional economic issues (Becker, 1981, 1993; Boland 1981; 
Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993). For this reason neoclassical economics has been described 
as the most imperialistic of the social sciences (Boland, 1982). Neoclassical “economic 
imperialism” (Swedberg, 1991) is illustrated by Becker’s contention that the economic 
approach can be utilized to evaluate most aspects of human behavior (1976). This view 
was reinforced by Hirshfield (1985) who argued that economics will gradually take over 
other social sciences.
Criticisms to the Neoclassical Approach
Despite its wide domain of application and its widespread acceptance by 
economists, the neoclassical approach to human behavior is not without shortcomings and 
has been criticized for a variety of reasons. The neoclassical approach to human behavior 
has been considered as amoral and unrealistic (Thurrow, 1983; Allvine and Tarpley, 1977; 
Wilber and Jameson, 1983) as well as simplistic and lacking structure (Sen, 1977; 
Hirschman, 1985). The neoclassical paradigm has also been criticized for its psychological 
naivete (Lutz and Lux, 1979). Neoclassical economics has also been scrutinized for its 
inability to offer a theoretical justification for the content or shape of the utility function 
(Simon, 1987). Simon (1963) also argues that, as a result of the information overload that 
the individual decision maker faces, it is impossible to truly maximize, i.e., select the very 
best alternative. He thus suggests that individuals select an alternative that yields a 
satisfactory, but not optimal, utility level. In other words, economic rationality, as viewed 
by Simon, is a bounded rationality.
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Alternative Economic Approaches
Although the neoclassical paradigm is the dominant approach in modem 
economics, several other conceptual frameworks have been suggested. Alternative 
approaches to economics have sprung from criticisms directed to neoclassical economics. 
Contrary to neoclassical economics, which considers that decisions are made in an 
isolated, acultural, and ahistoric context, institutional economics takes into account past 
and present social and cultural influences. The institutional approach stresses the 
importance of the institutions within which a given decision maker is evolving (Cohen, 
1991; Gruchy, 1987). The rational economic man is replaced by Homo institutionalis in 
this conceptual framework.
Paradigms such as the I-We paradigm (Etzioni, 1991) question the validity of an 
all encompassing utility function and suggest that decision makers maximize at least two 
quantities, utility or pleasure (I-Utility) and morality (We-Utility). Socioeconomics, which 
is derived from the I-We paradigm, refutes the individualistic and utilitarian approach 
taken by neoclassical economics. Instead, Socioeconomics proposes an approach based on 
codetermination, i.e., the integration of a variety of factors ranging from societal factors 
to variables used by neoclassical economics (Etzioni, 1988; Etzioni and Lawrence, 1991) 
Socioeconomics is an emerging field in economics that combines conventional neoclassical 
economics with other social sciences.
Several social scientists from various disciplines have long argued that adopting a 
multi-disciplinary approach by integrating other social sciences would significantly 
improve the neoclassical approach to human behavior. For example, on the premise that
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behavior is not only triggered by narrow selfishness, but also by a rich set of values and 
attitudes, neoclassical economists such as Becker (1976, 1991, 1993) have advocated the 
inclusion of constructs derived from other social sciences in economic evaluation of 
behavior. Leading socioeconomists (Etzioni, 1986) have suggested that economics would 
significantly benefit from fostering cooperation with sociologists and psychologists. 
Behavioral economists such as Simon (1987) compare economics without psychology to 
a very inefficient one-blade scissors. However, the transformation into the more effective 
two-blade scissors can be, it is argued, achieved by the integration of psychology to 
economics.
In attempting to improve the neoclassical approach to choice behavior by adding 
psychological constructs, the complementary psychological approach selected has to be 
easily integrated to the neoclassical paradigm without compromising the fundamental 
axioms upon which utility theory rests. In addition to providing an appropriate conceptual 
complement to the neoclassical approach to human behavior, the psychological theory 
selected has to be readily testable by allowing the economic formulation of verifiable 
hypotheses. The resulting combination has to preserve the conceptual integrity of both 
approaches. The improved analytical framework has to lend itself to empirical evaluation 
which constitutes the ultimate validation criterion of any meaningful economic theory.
The psychological approach considered should establish a clear relationship 
between attitudes and behavior. Although some social psychologists and psychologists 
have suggested that attitudes are not predictors of behavior (Wicker, 1969), a dominant 
part of the social psychology literature has established and empirically tested the
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significant role that attitudes play as precursors of human behavior and choices (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1988; Fazio, Powell, and Williams, 1989; Heberlein, 1989; 
Upmeyer and Six, 1989).
The theory of reasoned action, which is a social psychological approach for 
evaluating and predicting human behavior, fulfills the conditions mentioned above and 
provides an adequate complement to the neoclassical approach to choice behavior (Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1980). Prior to offering a behavioral model based on a multi-disciplinary 
approach integrating neoclassical economics and social psychology, the next section of this 
study highlights the main points of the theory of reasoned action.
A Social Psychology Approach to Behavior; The Theory of Reasoned Action
Fundamental to the social psychology literature connecting attitudes and behavior 
is the theory of reasoned action proposed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). The theory of 
reasoned action considers individuals as rational agents using at any given point in time 
the information available to them. The theory argues that an individual's intention is the 
prime determinant of his behavior or action. Intentions are determined by an attitude 
toward the behavior and a subjective norm. Attitudes refer to "a person's judgement that 
performing the behavior is good or bad" (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, p.6). More formally, 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) define attitude as an individual's assessment of a psychological 
object. A person's perception of social pressure exerted on him to perform a behavior 
constitutes his subjective norm (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Beliefs associated with an 
individual's attitude are his behavioral beliefs. Normative beliefs are defined as "beliefs 
underlying a person's subjective norm" (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, p.7). While one can
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hold a multitude of beliefs about a given behavior, research suggests one typically can only 
concentrate on a limited number of beliefs, usually between five and nine (Miller, 1956; 
Ajzen, 1991). These few relevant beliefs are known as salient beliefs (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1988).
Figure 3 provides a schematic representation of the theory of reasoned action. As 
previously stated, behavioral intention, the precursor of actual behavior, is a function of 
the individual’s attitude towards the behavior as well as his subjective norm. One’s attitude 
towards a behavior is determined by two components which are his salient behavioral 
beliefs and the subjective evaluations of those beliefs (Ajzen, 1991). Similarly, one’s 
subjective norm is determined by his salient normative beliefs and his corresponding 
motivation to comply (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1988).
The model derived from the theory of reasoned action can be expressed as follows 
(Upmeyer and Six, 1988):




Wj= Empirical weight attached to BI
(Ab)=  Attitude towards a behavior B, defined as £  Bj E; where,
B; =  Belief that a behavior will lead to outcome I 
Ej =  Evaluation of expected outcome I 
w2= Empirical weight attached to Ab
















Figure 3. Theory of Reasoned Action 
Source: adapted from Madden, Hellen, and Ajzen, 1992
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(SN)= Subjective norm, defined as £  NB-, MC; where,
Nb, = Perceived expectation of referent I 
Me; =  Motivation to comply with referent I
w3=  Empirical weight attached to SN.
In this mathematical formulation of the theory of reasoned action, behavior is 
expressed as a linear function of behavioral intention, attitude towards the behavior 
considered, and subjective norm. Each of the explanatory variables is weighted by an 
empirically determined coefficient. However, nothing in the theory of reasoned action 
precludes one from selecting alternative functional forms, including non linear functions, 
to describe the relationship between attitudes, behavioral intention, subjective norm, and 
observed behavior.
Extensions of the theory of reasoned action have been explored empirically and 
conceptually. For example, the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988) adds perceived 
behavioral control to the initial Fishbein-Ajzen model. Figure 4 provides a schematic 
representation of the theory of planned behavior. The theory of planned behavior allows 
a better evaluation of human behavior when individuals do not enjoy full volitional 
control. An individual enjoys full volitional control when participation decisions are 
voluntary and completely under his control. Perceived behavioral control refers to 
"beliefs regarding the possession of requisite resources and opportunities for performing 
a given behavior" (Madden, Ellen, and Ajzen, 1992, p.4). Because it allows the inclusion 
of additional explanatory variables (Beck and Ajzen, 1991), the theory of planned 
behavior is more flexible than the theory of reasoned action. For example, to account for
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A t t l l u d *
Figure 4. Theory of Planned Behavior 
Source: Madden, Hellen, and Ajzen, 1992
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the financial constraint of the decision maker, available financial resources can be 
included as a proxy for actual control (Beck and Ajzen, 1991).
The theory of reasoned action is not limited to a specific type of behavior and has 
been applied to a wide and diverse set of issues. Areas of application of the theory of 
reasoned action and its extensions include analyses and evaluation of leisure participation 
(Ajzen and Driver, 1991; 1992), dishonest behavior (Beck and Ajzen, 1991), job 
searching (van Ryn and Vinokur, 1990), voting choice (Watters, 1989, and class 
attendance (Ajzen and Madden, 1986).
Applications dealing with environmental attitudes have focused on adoption 
decisions. The evaluation of farmers adoption of soil conservation practices (Lynne and 
Rolla, 1988), and of water conservation techniques (Lynne, Casey, Hodges and 
Rahmani, 1994), are examples of the application of the theory of planned behavior in 
adoption analyses. In their study on adoption of water conservation techniques, Lynne 
et al. (1994) use the theory of planned behavior within a qualitative choice framework 
to assess Florida strawberry growers' willingness to invest in drip irrigation systems. 
The explanatory variables in this study included attitude, subjective norm, and perceived 
behavioral control measures. Interaction terms between these variables and farm size 
constituted the additional independent variables. The conceptual model was estimated 
using logit and tobit. While both models were significant, the tobit model, which used 
expenditures on drip irrigation as the dependent variable, yielded better results in terms 
of individual parameter significance. This study illustrates that with strong positive 
attitudes towards conservation practices, heavy influence of the community, and
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perceived control in the participation choice, a farmer is more likely to adopt 
conservation practices.
In summary, the theory of reasoned action reviewed above considers one’s 
attitudes, behavioral intention, and subjective norm as the primary explanatory factors 
to one’s behavior. Utility maximization rests on axioms establishing desirable 
mathematical properties of indifference curves as well as the completeness, transitivity, 
and rationality of the decision maker’s preferences. Fishbein and Ajzen’s social 
psychological approach to behavior has been extensively tested and is compatible with 
the axioms upon which utility maximization rests. The neoclassical approach to behavior 
can be enhanced by the inclusion of psychological constructs derived from the Fishbein 
Azjen model. The next section will present a multi-disciplinary approach to choice 
behavior resulting from the integration of the theory of reasoned action and neoclassical 
economics.
An Economic Psychological Approach to Behavior Evaluation
Despite all of its complexities and different facets, human behavior constitutes a 
whole that can not be arbitrarily segmented into distinct behavior classes each studied by 
a separate social science. As MacFayden and MacFayden (1986, p .3) suggest, "any 
single theoretical approach to explaining and predicting human behavior is unduly 
limiting." Proponents of this perspective are at the origin of several multi-disciplinary 
approaches to studying and predicting human behavior. This study focuses on approaches 
integrating two disciplines whose ultimate goals are to predict and explain human 
behavior, i.e., economics and psychology.
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The emerging discipline that deals with human behavior evaluation using 
economic and psychological methods has been referred to as behavioral economics, 
economic psychology, and psychological economics (Simon, 1963; MacFayden and 
MacFayden, 1986; Furnham and Lewis; 1986, Katona, 1980). Van Raaij (1986, p.9) 
offers a formal definition of behavioral economics and states that behavioral economics 
is "an interdisciplinary framework, within which the methods and theories from the 
disciplines of economics and psychology can be used to explain the economic behavior 
of individuals and groups." The definition applies either to economists supplementing 
their approach with psychological constructs or to psychologists complementing their 
theories with economic arguments and variables. The primary emphasis in this study is 
on supplementing economic analysis with psychological constructs.
Choice behavior has been suggested as constituting the major area of intersection 
between economics and psychology (Shapira, 1986). Because this study focuses on the 
evaluation of discrete choices such as technology adoption and participation decisions, 
the following analyses will be presented within a qualitative or discrete choice 
framework.
Discrete Choice Modeling
Qualitative choice modeling in economics is based on utility maximization and 
has traditionally considered two broad categories of explanatory variables. The first 
group of independent variables are the economic variables or decision variables. This 
group includes variables such as the different payoffs or benefits and opportunity costs 
associated with the alternative choices available. In the qualitative choice literamre, this
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first group of variables is often referred to as the alternative specific variables or mode 
characteristics (Amemiya, 1981), i.e., variables whose values depend on the alternative 
selected by the decision maker. The second group of explanatory factors are individual 
specific variables. Values taken by these variables are invariant to the alternative 
selected. These variables, which are commonly called socio-economic variables, 
represent distinctive features of the individual decision maker. These socio-economic 
factors include variables such as the age, income, gender, and education level of the 
individual decision maker.
In summary, within a qualitative choice framework, behavior and choice have 
been traditionally explained using the economic variables associated with the alternative 
options available and the socio-economic characteristics of decision makers. For 
example, in modeling the choice between alternative transportation modes, Domencich 
and McFadden (1975) included economic alternative specific variables such as transit 
walk time and auto parking charges plus operating costs, and variables like race and 
occupation as socio-economic factors. Attempts have been made to include additional 
classes of explanatory factors, including for example an environmental attitudinal 
measure (Luzar et al., 1995).
In this study, the evaluation of decision making and analysis of human behavior 
in social psychology are considered within the framework defined by the theory of 
reasoned action proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1980). The theory of reasoned action 
suggests that attitudes constitute the primary antecedents of behavioral intentions. 
Intentions are also influenced by the subjective norm, a measure of the effects of social
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
influences on the decision maker. Assuming that the decision maker enjoys total 
volitional control, behavioral intentions are in turn the principal precursors of actual 
behavior.
The neoclassical approach and the Fishbein-Ajzen model have been extensively 
used in economics and social psychology, respectively. Each approach considers a 
different set of relevant explanatory variables to evaluate and predict choice behavior. 
This study argues that a conceptually superior framework can be obtained by integrating 
the two approaches. By complementing traditional economic variables with psychological 
constructs such as attitudes, the behavioral approach proposed is expected to result in 
better modeling of choice behavior.
Proposed Behavioral Model
The overall framework proposed is illustrated by figure 5. The behavioral 
approach suggested combines the explanatory factors commonly used in economic 
modeling and independent variables used in social psychology to explain human 
behavior.
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that, following a careful evaluation of all 
the relevant information available, a decision maker will always select the alternative that 
allows him to maximize his economic benefits or utility. For this reason, potential 
economic benefits of alternative options available constitute a central explanatory factor 
in the behavioral approach that this study suggests. More specifically, potential net 
benefits, i.e., benefits minus all costs associated with a given action or choice are an 
important independent variable. Socio-economic characteristics of the decision maker are
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 5. Behavioral Model Integrating the Neoclassical Economic 
and Fishbein-Ajzen’s Social Psychological Approach
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also included in the proposed behavioral approach because economic theory suggests that 
they affect the decision maker's perception of potential economic benefits. Additional 
explanatory variables included in this behavioral approach to human behavior are social 
psychological constructs derived from the theory of reasoned action.
According to the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), one's 
attitudes and subjective norm are the main determinants of one's behavioral intention. 
The more positive a decision maker's attitude towards a behavior or an alternative, the 
more likely his intention to perform the behavior or select the alternative. One's 
behavioral intention is also influenced by the subjective norm, which accounts for the fact 
that decision makers are not isolated individuals, completely shielded from outside 
influence. Instead, as choice makers, decision makers are subject to social pressures and 
influences of family, friends, peers, cohorts, and many other groups or individuals whose 
opinions are valued
Interactions between the different independent factors previously mentioned are 
also conceptually significant in explaining the decision making process. Explanatory 
variables may have positive or negative influences on one another. For example, the 
socio-economic characteristics of the decision maker might affect his attitude towards a 
given choice or behavior. Similarly, perceived potential benefits that can be derived from 
an alternative choice or behavior can either mitigate or reinforce the attitude towards the 
behavior in question. For instance, if one holds a positive attitude towards performing 
a given behavior, the larger the potential economic benefits associated to the behavior, 
the larger the inclination to perform the behavior. Alternatively, if one possesses a
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negative attitude towards a given behavior, increased potential benefits may mitigate the 
impact of the attitude in the decision making process. While one might not readily agree 
to perform certain tasks, if adequately compensated, one might willingly change his 
opinion and do the task. The extent to which this mitigation effect of economic gains on 
one's negative attitude towards a behavior prevails has to be determined empirically. 
Regardless of how negative one's attitude towards a behavior, is there a threshold of 
economic benefits that will lead one to perform the behavior? Conversely, irrespective 
of the level of economic gains attached to a choice, is there a threshold of negative 
attitude, or disdain towards that behavior, that will prevent one from performing the 
behavior? These questions are asked to illustrate that potential economic benefits may 
significantly limit the weight attached to attitudes in a decision making process, and vice- 
versa. For the same reasons, the impact of the subjective norm on one's decision to 
engage in a behavior or make a choice can be amplified or restricted by potential 
economic gains. One's ethical inclination to do the "right thing" according to society or 
to persons whose opinion are valued is greatly reinforced if substantial economic gains 
are made in the process. In turn, behavioral intention is directly proportional to behavior. 
Provided that the individual decision maker enjoys complete volitional control, 
behavioral intention can be considered as a direct precursor to actual behavior.
In summary, the behavioral model proposed above draws from neoclassical 
economic theory and social psychology to consider four groups of explanatory variables. 
The socio-economic characteristics of the decision maker and the potential economic 
gains of the alternatives constitute two classes of explanatory factors that are traditionally
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included in economic qualitative choice modeling. To assess the decision maker’s anim^A 
towards the behavior considered and his subjective norm, two additional sets of 
explanatory variables suggested by the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980) are included in the behavioral model.
The explanatory ability and the predictive effectiveness of the behavioral model 
proposed above depend on accurate assessments of the different classes of independent 
variables including, decision makers' attitudes and subjective norms. Attitude evaluation 
and measurement as well as behavior predictions based on the theory of reasoned action 
or its extensions require prior assessment of several variables. Because attitudes are 
defined as A,, =  £  B-, Ej, the behavioral beliefs (Bj) that a behavior will lead to outcome 
I and subjective evaluations (Ej) of expected outcome I have to be assessed prior to the 
computation of a given attitude (A,,) towards a behavior. Behavior predictions based on 
the theory of reasoned action must also include a measure of the subjective norm (SN). 
In turn, the evaluation of the normative beliefs and the associated motivations to comply 
are prerequisites for the assessment of the subjective norm. Additional variables are 
required if extensions of the theory of reasoned action are used. For the theory of 
planned behavior, a measure of the perceived behavioral control has to be included.
The evaluation of attitudes via the theory of reasoned action, albeit soundly 
grounded in the social psychology literature, requires an intensive and extensive survey 
format. Increased length and survey detail, in any format, might have a negative impact 
on the survey's response rate and the quality of responses (Dillman, 1991). A unique 
survey has to be specifically designed for each and every behavior considered. To reduce
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data requirements when evaluating environmental behavior, environmental attitudes 
suggested by the proposed conceptual model can be assessed using an alternative attitude 
evaluation framework and instrument which demand less information to compute and 
apply to a wider range of environmental behavior. The New Environmental Paradigm 
(NEP) and the NEP scale (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978) offer such an alternative.
New Environmental (Ecological) Paradigm
The New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) proposed by Dunlap and Van Liere 
(1978) was prompted by a general and growing interest in public attitudes towards the 
environment. The NEP is based on the assumption that environmentalism implicitly 
challenges our essential views about nature and our relationship to it (Dunlap and Van 
Liere, 1978). Within the NEP framework, Van Liere and Dunlap developed 12 Likert 
items assessing the three belief domains of the paradigm, i.e., beliefs about our ability 
to disturb the balance of nature, limits to growth, and the proper role of humans in 
nature. The overall internal consistency and the predictive ability of the 12 Likert items 
allowed the authors to consider them as a single entity named the "New Environmental 
Paradigm Scale."
The measurement of attitudes towards the environment using NEP scales is 
relatively straightforward. After the administration of the survey, a score is computed 
for each respondent by direct summation. These scores are then evaluated using 
descriptive statistics, such as correlation coefficients, factor loadings, or a  values.
Since its creation, the NEP scale has been extensively used to analyze and 
contrast environmental attitudes of different groups. Caron (1989) used the scale to
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assess the environmental attitudes of African Americans and to compare them with those 
held by Caucasians. A similar study focusing on the Hispanic community has been 
conducted by Noe and Snow (1990). Hall’s assessment of Soviets' environmental 
perceptions is another application of the NEP scale (1990).
The relationship between environmental attitudes and socio-economic variables 
constitutes another area of application of the NEP scale. In a survey paper, Van Liere 
and Dunlap (1980) reviewed the main social correlates of environmental attitudes 
hypothesized in the literature and analyzed the existing empirical evidence. They found 
that only education, age, and political ideology were consistently and significantly 
correlated with environmental attitudes. Education and age were respectively found to 
be positively and negatively correlated with environmental attitudes. A liberal ideology 
was also positively correlated with environmental attitudes. Evidence supporting 
correlation hypotheses between environmental attitudes and sex, occupation, or residence 
was not found.
The NEP scale has also been used to evaluate the relationship between 
environmental attitudes and environmental knowledge. Arcury (1990), for example, 
concluded that there is a weak but consistent positive correlation between attitudes and 
knowledge. The author also demonstrated that, at least for his sample, the prevailing 
level of environmental knowledge was very low.
Using an extended NEP scale, Kuhn and Jackson (1989) tested the temporal 
stability of the scales. Their study concluded that the scales were stable and could be 
used for inter-temporal comparisons and assessments of attitude changes over time.
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Despite its usefulness and various applications, the NEP scale is not without 
critics. For example, its lack of grounding in the social psychology literature on attitudes 
has been criticized by Heberlein (1981). In addition, Albrecht, Bultena, Hoiberg, and 
Nowak (1982) and Geller and Lasley (1985) argue that the NEP scale is not a single 
entity but is instead a multidimensional construct. The multi-dimensionality of the scale 
is due to its initial design. All but four of the 12 Likert items were worded in a pro- 
environmental direction (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, Catton, and Howell, 1992). This 
prompted researchers to use subsets of the original scale, identified in the literature as 
modified NEP scales (Edged and Nowell, 1989; Arcury, Johnson, and Scollay, 1990; 
L uzaretal., 1995).
To correct the imbalance existing in the original scale and broaden its scope, a 
New Ecological Paradigm Scale was proposed by Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, Catton, 
and Howell (1992). This revised scale also gives respondents the option to answer 
"unsure". The revised NEP scale contains 15 questions. It was extended by including 
questions about exemptionalism, i.e., "the idea that humans-unlike other species—are 
exempt from the constraints of nature" (Dunlap et al, 1992, p.6).
Historically, environmental attitude assessment has been based on two 
approaches, the agreement scale (Likert) approach which gives an overad attitude 
measure based on a single scale, and a more conceptuady grounded social psychological 
approach. The New Environmental (or Ecological) Paradigm and the social psychology 
literature on the relationship between attitudes and behavior provide alternative 
frameworks used to measure environmental attitudes. Attitudinal evaluation and
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
measurement fundamental to designing and implementing incentive-based programs may 
take either of the two forms, with trade-offs inherent to each. The extensive testing, 
documentation, and reliability of overall environmental attitudinal measures obtained 
through the NEP-type assessment are counterbalanced by the more data intensive but 
conceptually superior social psychology approach typified by the Fishbein-Ajzen 
approach.
Summary
This chapter has argued that traditional neoclassical economic modeling of choice 
behavior can be conceptually enhanced by the addition of psychological constructs such 
as attitudes. Behavioral economic models based on this multi-disciplinary approach 
include economic variables, socio-economic characteristics of decision makers, attitude 
and social norm measures. The derivation of attitudinal measures may either rely on the 
social psychological foundation offered by the theory of reasoned action or depend on 
a less specific but much easier measure offered by the New Environmental Paradigm 
scale.
The next chapter will empirically test the conceptual behavioral model presented. 
Following a description of the survey instrument used, the data sources and summary 
statistics will be presented. Then, estimation results of alternative formulations of the 
conceptual model presented will be reported and discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The previous chapter reviewed the neoclassical economic approach to choice 
behavior and proposed an alternative behavioral economic approach. The neoclassical 
economic approach discussed evaluates choice within the traditional utility maximization 
framework. The two classes of explanatory factors traditionally considered within this 
framework include economic factors such as benefits associated with different 
alternatives and socio-economic characteristics such as the decision maker’s income and 
age. The behavioral economic approach proposed here is multi-disciplinary, integrating 
neoclassical economics and social psychology. It conceptually supplements the traditional 
neoclassical economic approach by including psychological constructs as additional 
explanatory factors in the evaluation and prediction of choice behavior.
Following a presentation of a general conceptual model based on the theoretical 
framework proposed in the previous chapter, several empirical models are derived and 
discussed. Data collection procedures and instruments used, including the survey 
questionnaire, and sample properties are also presented. The description of the estimation 
techniques and the results of the empirical estimations are then presented and discussed. 
Theoretical Model
This study evaluates wetlands owners’ voluntary decision to offer acres of 
wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. Within this framework, offer of participation and 
non-involvement in the program are the two alternative choices available to wetland
66
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owners. Using the conceptual model developed in the previous chapter, the evaluation 
and prediction of discrete choice behavior such as offers of participation in the Wetland 
Reserve Program can be expressed in a general form as:
Choice = /(Economic variables; Socio-economic variables; Psychological constructs) (10)
The dependent variable, choice, constitutes a measure of the participation decision 
or intention. The participation choice is expressed as a function of different classes of 
independent factors considered relevant in explaining choice behavior. Alternative 
expressions of the dependent variable result in different econometric modeling 
approaches. For example, a binary representation of the choice variable yields a 
dichotomous choice model. The expression of the choice dependent variable as a 
continuous, but restricted, variable requires the use of limited dependent modeling 
approaches.
The nature of the independent variables included in the model depends on the 
conceptual framework adopted. Within the traditional neoclassical economic approach 
to behavior, economic variables and socio-economic characteristics are typically two 
classes of explanatory variables considered. Modeling choice behavior within the 
expanded behavioral economic framework proposed in this study includes an additional 
class of independent variables, psychological constructs.




The primary data necessary for empirically evaluating the conceptual model 
presented in equation (10) were collected via a mail survey of Louisiana's wetland 
owners conducted by the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness of 
Louisiana State University in the spring of 1996. The design and implementation of the 
mail survey were consistent with Dillman’s Total Design Method (TDM) (1991). The 
TDM guides questionnaire design and recommends successive mailings for improved 
response rates and response quality. The mail survey was composed of a combination of 
closed and open format questions. For the first mailing, a questionnaire, a postage-paid 
return envelope, and a letter identifying the purpose of the survey and intended uses of 
the data collected were sent to a sample of wetland owners. The second mailing consisted 
of a post card reemphasizing the importance of answering and returning the 
questionnaire. The third and final mailing targeted respondents who had not yet returned 
a completed survey. The correspondence sent to wetland owners in the survey process 
is attached in Appendix A.
The survey, which includes six major sections, is attached in Appendix A.2. The 
first section of the survey assessed the respondent’s awareness and level of knowledge 
about the WRP. This section also identifies the respondent’s sources of information 
concerning the Wetland Reserve Program. The next section elicited information about 
the respondent’s land. Information requested in this section included the total acreage, 
the acreage of agricultural land, and wetlands owned by the respondent. Information on
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the location and type of wetlands, the crops grown, labor, and per acre return on the 
wetlands was requested.
The third section elicited information about the respondent’s participation in the 
Wetland Reserve Program. Questions pertaining to intentions and effective participation 
in the WRP, as well as the number of acres of wetlands offered, and the per acre 
compensation proposed or requested are included in this section. This section also 
provided information on the major reasons for participation or non-involvement in the 
WRP.
In the fourth section of the survey, the environmental attitudes of the respondents 
were evaluated. Attitude assessments were either based on the New Ecological Paradigm 
or the theory of reasoned action. The evaluation of environmental attitudes via the NEP 
approach was done by using the standard 15 questions of the revised NEP scale. Within 
the framework proposed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), environmental attitudes towards 
participating in the WRP were measured via a series of questions eliciting behavioral 
beliefs and the subjective evaluations of those beliefs. For the associated subjective norm, 
normative beliefs, and the corresponding motivations to comply with these beliefs were 
elicited by the remaining questions in this section. Questions about the respondents’ 
involvement in environmental and agricultural organizations were also included in this 
section.
The fifth section of the survey gathered socio-economic information, including 
respondents’ age, income, gender, and level of education. A sixth and final open format 
section was included in the survey to allow respondents to express their opinion, and
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share their suggestions. In summary, the mail survey gathered data on the respondent’s 
land, level of information about the WRP, degree of participation in the WRP, 
environmental attitudes, and socio-economic characteristics.
Survey Sample
Three different sources provided the information necessary to build the mailing 
list used for this mail survey. A list of 127 Louisiana wetland owners currently active in 
the WRP was included. In addition, a list of 195 wetland owners who expressed to the 
NRCS their intention to participate in the WRP was compiled from the available WRP 
eligibility forms filed with the NRCS. The third component of the mailing list was 
provided by the Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service, which provided a list of 471 
randomly selected wetland owners. Due to undeliverable addresses, 26 surveys were 
returned. A final mailing list of 767 wetland owners was used for the mail survey.
Survey Summary Statistics
Of the 767 surveys mailed, a total of 174 completed surveys where returned, for 
an overall response rate of 22.7 percent. About two-thirds of the respondents (or 133 
respondents) offered to enroll in the WRP. However, only 73 respondents (or 42 percent) 
effectively enrolled wetlands in the WRP. Wetland owners who did not participate in the 
WRP represented 58 percent of the respondents. Due to item non-responses in 41 
questionnaires, only 143 surveys were used in the empirical analysis, yielding an 
adjusted response rate of 18.64 percent. Out of these 143 respondents, only 28 (or 19.58 
percent) did not offer to participate in the WRP. Frequency tables as well a summary of 
descriptive statistics for the 174 surveys collected are presented in Appendix C.
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Respondents to the mail survey were predominantly male (83.7 percent), owned on 
average, 1,118.28 acres of land, including 484.43 acres of wetlands, and were, on 
average 55.4 years old. The average size of wetlands offered and enrolled in the WRP 
were 130 acres and 72 acres, respectively. This sample is, by comparison to Louisiana’s 
landowners, slightly older and less male-dominated. Louisiana’s landowners are mostly 
male (92.7 percent) and on average are 53.5 years old (Census of Agriculture, 1992). In 
addition, respondents to this survey own more land than the average Louisiana farmer 
who in 1992, on average, owned 306 acres (Census o f Agriculture, 1992). Individuals 
who responded to this survey are, on average, wealthier and more educated than 
Louisiana residents. While the average yearly income in Louisiana is $15,931 (University 
of New Orleans, 1994), 65 percent of the respondents reported an income equal to or 
greater than $45,000 a year. In Louisiana, 36.6 percent of the adult population has some 
college education or more. For the sample of respondents, this proportion reaches 73.7 
percent (National Center for Education Statistics, 1995).
In the following sections, empirical models derived from the theoretical model 
previously discussed are presented. Estimation techniques used to evaluate wetland 
owners’ participation in the WRP in Louisiana, and empirical results are presented and 
discussed.
Empirical Models
In order to empirically evaluate the choice behavior relevant to WRP offers of 
participation, two approaches were considered. First, the dependent variable, choice, was 
expressed as a binary variable. Logit and Probit are the two appropriate econometric
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approaches used in binary choice modeling. Because they essentially yield comparable 
results (Amemiya, 1981; Capps and Kramer, 1985; Maddala, 1991), the selection of one 
approach over the other is left to the discretion of the researcher. This study considered 
a Probit approach for the modeling of landowners' decision to offer acres of wetlands for 
enrollment in the Wetland Reserve Program in Louisiana.
The second approach evaluates the level of participation of respondents. The 
choice dependent variable is thus represented by the number of acres of wetlands offered 
for enrollment by landowners willing to participate in the WRP. Acres of wetlands 
offered for enrollment were substituted for acres effectively enrolled in the Wetland 
Reserve Program following the evaluation of the characteristics of the program and the 
data collected. Due to budgetary constraints, several wetland owners were not afforded 
the opportunity to participate in the WRP. For example, out of the 174 completed 
surveys used in this study, one third of wetland owners who offered to participate in the 
WRP were denied enrollment.
Modeling landowners' levels of participation requires another econometric 
approach when the dependent variable is represented by the number of acres of wetlands 
offered for enrollment. When a dependent variable is limited to values between zero and 
infinity, a censored regression, or Tobit model, constitutes the appropriate econometric 
approach (Amemyia, 1994; Maddala, 1988). Because the values taken by the number of 
acres offered for enrollment in the WRP are restricted to the positive quadrant, zero 
included, landowners' intention to participate in the WRP was modeled using a Tobit 
approach.
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Decisions to offer participation as well as levels of participation in the WRP are 
conditional upon the dissemination of information. Because the Wetland Reserve 
Program is a well publicized federal program that has been promoted and discussed in 
print media, radio, television, specialized journals, and extension services, this study 
assumed that information pertaining to the WRP was completely disseminated. In fact, 
all 143 respondents used in the empirical analysis were aware of the Wetland Reserve 
Program (Q .l of the survey). Thus, sample selection bias resulting from incomplete 
information dissemination, which is generally observed in emerging technology adoption 
decisions (Saha, Love, and Schwart; 1994), was not considered in this study.
Probit Models
Three alternative models of participation choices were estimated. First, an initial 
model including explanatory factors traditionally used in economic qualitative choice 
modeling was estimated. The second Probit model estimated added an overall attitudinal 
measure based on the New Environmental Paradigm to the initial model. The third 
participation choice model estimated supplemented the initial model with psychological 
constructs derived from the social psychological theory of reasoned action. For the three 
models considered in this section, the choice dependent variable was a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the wetland owner offered to participate in the WRP, 0 otherwise.
The estimation of the Probit models was accomplished using a maximum 
likelihood approach. Maximum likelihood estimators are consistent, asymptotically 
normally distributed, and asymptotically efficient (Judge, et al., 1988). As illustrated by 
the likelihood function, the estimation of Probit models via maximum likelihood
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normalizes the variance to one for identification purposes (Windmeijer, 1995). Thus, a 
homoscedasticity assumption is not required for estimating Probit models via maximum 
likelihood (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). The log likelihood function is:
T T
i = E y,In *■(*/?) + E v-y) ln c1 - /̂P)l (ll)
i=i <=i
The binary dependent variable, the explanatory variables, and the vector of parameters 
to estimate are represented by y„ xj, and P, respectively. F is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function (Judge, et al., 1988).
In addition to the parameter estimates, changes in probabilities, and their 
corresponding standard errors, a likelihood ratio test is presented for each model as a test 
of overall significance. The likelihood ratio test, which has a x2 distribution, is derived 
from the maximum of the log likelihood function of the unrestricted model and the 
maximum of the log likelihood function of a restricted model, assuming that all the 
parameters except the intercept are equal to zero. The likelihood ratio is expressed as:
k  = 2 [ L (P) -  1(0) ] (12)
Maxima of the log likelihood functions of the unrestricted and restricted models are 
represented by L(p) and L(0), respectively (White, 1993).
Alternative R2 measures are presented for each model. The R2 measures reported 
include the Aldrich and Nelson (1984), McFadden (1974), and Veall and Zimmermann
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(1992) R2's. Formulas for these R2 measures are given in equations (13) to (16). Aldrich 
and Nelson’s R2 (R2̂ -) is computed as:
* "  ‘  ( l 3 )
The R2̂  is based on the likelihood ratio test statistic. However, it does not adjust for the 
degrees of freedom (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). To achieve an upper limit o f one, the 
R2vz is calculated by multiplying the R2̂  by a correction factor (Windmeijer, 1995). Veall 
and Zimmermann’s R2 (R2vz) is:
. J l  (14)
k+n 21(0)
McFadden’s R2 (R2MF), one of the most commonly used R 2measures in qualitative choice 
models, is given by :
r 2 u f  = 1 " C— 1 ( 15)MF L(0) ’
When adjusted for degrees of freedom, McFadden’s R2 (R2Mfa) ^  written:
R 2 = j ( i6)
MFA L(0)/(n~l)
Although the R2MF and R?MFA lie within the [0, 1] interval, they can not be used as a 
measure of explained variation because, in addition to the second moments, they involve 
all the characteristics of the distribution (Laitila, 1993).
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No one R2 measure is universally accepted and used as a goodness-of-fit measure. 
The suggested approach is to base the evaluation of qualitative choice models on several 
measures when evaluating qualitative choice models (Amemiya, 1981; Laitila, 1993).
The Akaike information criterion (AIC), which is a simple way to compare nested 
models while adjusting for their respective degrees of freedom, is also reported. The model 
with the smallest AIC is preferred. The AIC is written as (Amemiya, 1981):
The sample size and number o f parameters estimated are represented by n and k, 
respectively.
Apart from indicating the direction of the influence of a variable on the 
participation choice, parameter estimates do not have any direct economic interpretation. 
Thus, the marginal changes in probabilities and their standard errors are also reported.
The changes in probabilities, as computed in Judge, et al., (1988) are the partial 
derivatives of the probability function evaluated at each independent variable’s sample 
mean, are expressed as:
The probability distribution function of the standard normal, vectors of sample means 
and parameter estimates, and the coefficient corresponding to the independent variable 
considered are represented b y / ,  x, p, and P j , respectively. Standard errors reported for
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the changes in probabilities were computed using a linear approximation. They were 
obtained by multiplying each parameter estimate by the value of/(x{3). A more precise 
approach to computing standard errors for the changes in probability would be to account 
for the nonlinearity of the relationship between parameter estimates and probability 
changes using bootstrapping techniques. (Krinsky and Robb 1986; Efron, 1987). A linear 
approximation can lead to a significant underestimation of the standard errors. As 
illustrated by Krinsky and Robb (1986), the linear estimates of the standard errors can 
be ten times smaller than bootstrap values.
EfeQctessisal Economic Model
The basic Probit model estimated to evaluate wetlands owners’ participation 
choices expresses the choice dependent variable as a function of economic and socio­
economic variables. This initial Probit model is given as:
OFFERWRP = F  (LTOTAL, LWET, REVENUE, KNOWRP, INFOWRP, WETFARM, 





1 if the wetland owner offered acres for enrollment in 
WRP; 0 otherwise
LTOTAL (+ ) = Total acreage owned (expressed in log form)
LWET (+ ) = Acres of wetlands owned (expressed in log form)
REVENUE ( - )  = 1 if the respondent’s yearly average net return per acre 
increased or stayed the same; 0 otherwise
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+)  =  
+ - )  =  
- )  =
+ - )  =  
- )  =
+ - )  =
- )  =  
- )  =  
+) =
1 if the respondent learned about the WRP from the 
extension service; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent has at least a good knowledge about 
WRP; 0 otherwise
I if the respondent owns farmed wetlands; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent grows soybeans; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent does not belongs to an environmental 
organization; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s gender; I if male; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s education level; 1 if at least attended 
college; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s residence; 1 if respondent resides in a city of 
more than 10,000 people; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s age (expressed in log form)
Number of persons living in respondent’s household
Respondent’s income; 1 if respondent’s annual income is 
greater or equal to $55,000; 0 otherwise
Error term
A large dispersion, as measured by the standard error, was observed for the 
continuous variables included in this model. In order to control the variability o f the 
continuous variables, i.e., stabilize their variance, a non-decreasing monotonic 
transformation was performed so that continuous variables were expressed in logarithmic 
form. For each explanatory variable, the hypothesized sign of the parameter estimate is 
indicated in parentheses above. LTOTAL, the variable measuring the total acreage 
owned by the respondent, was assumed to positively affect the participation decision. It
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was hypothesized that the more land a wetland owner possesses, the greater his ability 
to adjust his land use options and thus, the greater his willingness to participate in 
conservation programs such as the WRP. The same reasoning underlies the positive sign 
hypothesized for the estimate associated with LWET, the variable expressing the acreage 
of wetlands owned.
A negative sign was hypothesized for the revenue variable, REVENUE. Increased 
or equal returns per acre of wetlands were hypothesized to negatively affect the 
inclination to participate in the WRP because they lower the opportunity costs of not 
getting involved in the WRP. Missing data on the returned questionnaires prevented the
r
inclusion of marginal benefits and opportunity costs of the alternative participation 
choices.
To capture the effect of the quality and amount of information received by 
respondents, two information variables were included. Variables representing the source 
of information and the level of knowledge about the WRP were hypothesized to 
positively affect participation. A wetland owner who learned about the WRP via the 
Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service was hypothesized to have a clearer 
understanding of the nature of the program and the options it offers. KNOWRP, the 
variable representing the respondent’s source of information about the WRP, was 
therefore hypothesized to have a positive sign. A positive sign was also hypothesized for 
INFOWRP, the variable expressing the respondent’s self-assessed level of information. 
The greater a wetland owner’s level of information about the program, it was 
hypothesized that he would be more likely to offer to participate in the WRP.
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Due to the declining trend observed in the real prices of most of the major crops 
grown in Louisiana (Zapata and Frank, 1995), an individual owning fanned wetlands 
was assumed to be more inclined to offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP than an 
individual owning other types of wetlands such as bottomland hardwood forests who 
might anticipate an economic return on the timber. A positive sign is thus hypothesized 
for the variable WETFARM, specified in this model as a dummy variable, equal to 1 if 
the respondent owns farmed wetlands, 0 otherwise.
No a priori sign hypothesis was formulated for CROP, the dummy variable 
representing the main crop grown by the respondents. Its inclusion in the model 
determined the relationship between participation in the WRP and soybeans, the main 
crop grown by wetland owners in this sample. The variable CROP was specified as a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the main crop grown by respondents was soybeans, 0 
otherwise.
A negative sign was hypothesized for ENVORG, the variable representing the 
respondent’s non-involvement in an environmental organization. The variable ENVORG 
was specified as a dummy variable equal to 0 if the respondent belong to an 
environmental organization, 1 otherwise. The wetland owner’s involvement in an 
environmental organization was expected to positively affect participation in perceived 
environment-improving conservation programs.
Negative signs were hypothesized for EDUCATE, LAGE, and DEPEND, the 
variables representing the level of education, the age, and the number of people in the 
household, respectively. It was hypothesized that due to their greater ability to
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understand the intricacies of property rights limitations inherent to the WRP, more 
educated wetland owners would be less inclined to offer land for enrollment in the WRP. 
It was also hypothesized that age would be inversely related to the decision to offer 
wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. Older wetland owners were hypothesized to view 
the property rights restrictions attached to the permanent easement as a limitation on the 
property that could be passed on to their heirs. Thus, a negative sign was hypothesized 
for the parameter estimate associated with the variable LAGE.
Similarly, it was hypothesized that the more people living in a wetland owner’s 
household, i.e., the more dependents or potential heirs, the less likely he would be to 
offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP due to the additional restrictions that the 
perpetual easement would impose on his heirs. A negative sign was thus hypothesized 
for DEPEND, the variable representing the number of people living in a wetland owner’s 
household. It was also hypothesized that wealthier wetland owners were more flexible 
to explore alternative options for their property. Therefore, INCOME, the variable 
representing the respondent’s income level, was hypothesized to have a positive effect 
on the decision to offer wedands for enrollment in the WRP. To reflect characteristics 
of this sample for which 65 percent of the wedand owners had an annual income of at 
least $55,000, INCOME was defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s 
yearly income was at least $55,000, 0 otherwise.
High intercorrelations between variables, i.e., multicollinearity, is often observed 
in socio-economic data. In order to test for the presence of multicollinearity which 
inflates the variances of the estimates, collinearity diagnostic tests based on condition
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indexes were performed. Collinearity tests suggested that, for this sample, the 
explanatory factors selected to explain wetland owners’ decision to offer to participate 
in the WRP were not correlated. The value of the largest condition index resulting from 
the principal components analysis performed was 3.54. As suggested by Belsley, Kuh, 
and Welsch (1980), condition indexes less than 10 indicate very mild collinearity between 
the variables considered. Condition indexes are listed in Appendix D.
The models were estimated using SAS (SAS Institute, 1993) and SHAZAM 
(White, 1993). Parameter estimates, asymptotic standard errors, changes in probabilities, 
the percentage of right predictions, and goodness-of-fit measures are reported in Table 
4.1. The prediction success table is presented in Appendix B.l .
The likelihood ratio test (LR), which tests the null hypothesis that all the 
parameter estimates, except the one associated with the intercept, are different from zero, 
suggests that, overall, the model is significant. The value of the LR test is 46.26 with 14 
degrees of freedom. At a 99 percent confidence level, the corresponding critical %~ 
statistic is 29.14. The estimated model correctly predicted 84.61 percent of wetland 
owners’ participation choices. However, while the model accurately predicted 94.7 
percent of the choices for respondents who offered to participate in the WRP, it only 
correctly predicted 42.8 percent of the choices for wetland owners who did not offer 
participation. This uneven predictive ability may be due to the relatively low number of 
respondents who did not offer to participate in the WRP. Computed R2 measures range 
from 0.244 for the Aldrich and Nelson’s R2 to 0.490 for the Veal and Zimmermann 
measure.
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Parameter estimates for the variables LWET, INFO WRP, WETFARM, 
ENVORG, EDUCATE, DEPEND, and INCOME are significantly different from zero 
at a 90 percent confidence level. All signs on parameter estimates significantly different 
from zero support the a priori hypotheses previously discussed. The negative sign of the 
coefficients for the socio-economic variables EDUCATE and DEPEND suggests that the 
level of education and number of people in the household of the wetland owner adversely 
affect the propensity to offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP.
The clearer understanding of the property right restrictions associated with the 
WRP that more educated individuals are likely to possess may help explain the negative 
effect of education. Similarly, wetland owners with a greater number of dependents may 
be less inclined to offer wetlands for enrollment due to the limitations that it would place 
on the land passed on to heirs. Income levels greater than $55,000 were found to 
positively influence offers of participation. The flexibility to explore alternative options 
for their land afforded to wetland owners by a high income may possibly allow them to 
better face the permanent and strict restrictions imposed under the WRP.
Parameter estimates were positive for LWET, INFOWRP, and WETFARM. The 
positive sign of the coefficients for the variables LWET, INFOWRP, and WETFARM 
suggests that, as hypothesized, greater acreage of wetland owned, more knowledge about 
the program, and the ownership of farmed wetlands have a positive effect on the decision 
to offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. The impact of permanent restrictions 
imposed on a portion of her land may be reduced by a respondent’s ownership of larger 
acreage of wetlands. Declining crop prices and the opportunity to make knowledgeable
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Table 4.1
Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Neoclassical Economic Model







LWET 0.197* 0.111 0.032 0.018
REVENUE 0.221 0.327
KNOWRP 0.337 0.335
INFOWRP 1.194* 0.327 0.196 0.053
WETFARM 0.686* 0.336 0.113 0.055
CROP 0.035 0.315
ENVORG -0.730* 0.407 -0.120 0.066
GENDER -0.838 0.599
EDUCATE -1.234* 0.475 -0.202 0.077
RESIDE 0.380 0.373
LAGE -0.698 0.725
DEPEND -0.339* 0.150 -0.056 0.024
INCOME 1.012* 0.433 0.166 0.071
CONSTANT 5.105 3.275
N = 143 AIC = 62.587 
Likelihood Ratio Test = 46.26 with 14 d.f.
Percentage of Right Predictions = 84.61 percent
R2AN =0.244; R2MF =0.327; R2MFA =0.253; R2̂  =0.490
♦Estimates significant at a 90 percent confidence level (critical t-statistic =1.645)
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decisions may help explain the positive effect of the ownership of fanned wetlands and 
greater levels of information on participation offers.
Changes in probabilities reported in Table 4.1 provide information on the 
marginal effect of each independent variable on the decision to offer wetlands for 
enrollment in the WRP. For example, in the case of the dummy variable EDUCATE 
representing the respondent’s level of education, the probability that highly educated 
wetland owners will offer acres for enrollment in the WRP, ceteris paribus, is 
approximately 0.20 lower than if wetland owners did not attend college. For continuous 
variables, changes in probabilities are interpreted as the effect on the decision to offer 
wetlands for enrollment in the WRP associated with a one unit change of the explanatory 
factor considered. For example, a one unit increase in the variable DEPEND, which 
indicates the number of people living in the respondent’s household, will result in a
0.056 decrease in the probability to offer acres of wetlands for enrollment in the WRP.
Behavioral Model with NEP Measure
The second model estimated extended the neoclassical economic model presented 
in equation (19) by including a psychological construct developed to measure 
environmental attitudes. This specification used the NEP framework to derive the 
measure of environmental attitudes. In addition to the variables included in the 
neoclassical economic model, the behavioral model with the NEP measure uses an 
environmental attitudinal measure derived from the revised New Environmental 
Paradigm, or New Ecological Paradigm. The behavioral model with NEP can be 
formally expressed as:
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OFFERWRP= F  (LTOTAL, LWET, REVENUE, KNOWRP, INFOWRP,
WETFARM, CROP, ENVORG, GENDER, EDUCATE, 
RESIDE, LAC-E, DEPEND, INCOME, LNEP, e )  (20)
where:
OFFERWRP =  1 if the wetland owner offered acres for enrollment in
WRP; 0 otherwise
LTOTAL (+ ) =  Total acreage owned (expressed in log form)
LWET (+ )  =  Acres of wetlands owned (expressed in log form)
REVENUE ( - )  =  1 if the respondent’s yearly average net return per acre
increased or stayed the same; 0 otherwise
KNOWRP (+ )  =  1 if the respondent learned about the WRP from an
extension service; 0 otherwise
INFOWRP (+ )  =  1 if the respondent has at least good knowledge about
WRP; 0 otherwise
WETFARM (+ ) =  1 if the respondent owns farmed wetlands; 0 otherwise
CROP ( + -  ) =  1 if respondent grows soybeans; 0 otherwise
ENVORG ( - )  =  1 if the respondent does not belongs to an environmental
organization; 0 otherwise
GENDER ( + - )  =  Respondent’s gender; 1 if male; 0 otherwise
EDUCATE ( - )  =  Respondent’s education level; 1 if at least attended
college; 0 otherwise
RESIDE ( + -  ) =  Respondent’s residence; 1 if respondent resides in a city of
more than 10,000 people; 0 otherwise
LAGE ( - )  =  Respondent’s age (expressed in log form)
DEPEND ( - )  =  Number of persons living in respondent’s household
INCOME (+ )  =  Respondent’s income; 1 if respondent’s annual income is
greater or equal to $55,000; 0 otherwise
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LNEP (+ ) =  Respondent’s environmental attitude measured by the log
value of the NEP score
€ =  Error term
The variables and signs hypotheses for the original explanatory factors used in 
the neoclassical economic model are consistent with this model. LNEP, the variable 
expressing the environmental attitude of the wetland owner, as measured by the revised 
New Environmental Paradigm scale, is added in this model. The NEP scale contains a 
set of 15 questions formulated either in a pro-environmental fashion or in anti- 
environmental manner. Questions formulated in a pro-environmental fashion were scored 
using a 1 to 5 Likert scale, with 5 for “strongly agree”, 4 for “agree”, 3 for 
“uncertain”, 2 for “disagree” , and, 1 for “strongly disagree” . As suggested by Lynne, 
et al. (1994) and Luzar, et al. (1995), the NEP score of individuals displaying positive 
environmental attitudes was maximized by reversing the Likert scale for the scoring of 
questions presented in an anti-environmental fashion. For each respondent, the NEP 
score was obtained by summing the 15 individual scores. The variable LNEP is the log 
value of the respondents’ NEP-derived score. A positive sign was hypothesized for the 
parameter estimate corresponding to LNEP. Considering the proposed beneficial effect 
of the WRP on the environment, it was hypothesized that the more positive a wetland 
owner’s overall environmental attitude as measured by the NEP, the more likely she is 
to offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. The largest condition index obtained from 
the principal component analysis performed was 3.625, suggesting that there was no
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serious multicollinearity problem within the set of regressors used in this model. 
Condition indexes are listed in Appendix D.
Parameter estimates, standard errors, changes in probabilities, and the percentage 
of right predictions are presented in Table 4.2. The likelihood ratio test suggests that, 
overall, the model is significant. The value of the LR test is 53.6 with 15 degrees of 
freedom. At a 99 percent confidence level, the corresponding critical x2 statistic is 30.58. 
Goodness-of-fit measures are also reported in Table 4.2, ranging from 0.273 for the 
Aldrich and Nelson’s R2, to 0.549 for the Veall and Zimmermann F? measure. This 
model specification correctly predicted 84.61 percent of the wetland owners’ 
participation choices. As indicated by the prediction success table presented in Table B.2, 
participation choices for respondents who offered to enroll in the WRP were more 
accurately predicted than choices made by respondents who did not offer to participate 
in the program. The prediction success rates for participants and non-participants were 
93.91 percent and 46.42 percent, respectively. These unbalanced success rates may be 
due to the limited number of respondents who did not offer to participate in the WRP.
At a 90 percent confidence level, parameter estimates for the variables LWET, 
INFOWRP, WETFARM, ENVORG, EDUCATE, DEPEND, INCOME, AND LNEP 
are significantly different from zero. Parameter estimates are consistent, in sign and 
magnitude, with the coefficients of the neoclassical economic model presented earlier. 
The positive signs of the estimates corresponding to the variables INFOWRP, 
WETFARM, and INCOME suggest that the level of information about the WRP, the 
ownership of farmed wetlands, and high levels of income have a positive effect on the
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Table 4.2
Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Behavioral Model with NEP







LW ET 0.198* 0.115 0.032 0.018
REVENUE 0.126 0.345
KNOWRP 0.253 0.352
INFOWRP 1.207* 0.337 0.195 0.054
WETFARM 0.882* 0.362 0.142 0.058
CROP 0.056 0.325
ENVORG -0.895* 0.432 -0.145 0.069
GENDER -0.754 0.594
EDUCATE -1.186* 0.497 -0.191 0.080
RESIDE 0.462 0.385
LAGE -0.799 0.747
DEPEND -0.331* 0.151 -0.053 0.024
INCOME 1.009* 0.458 0.163
LNEP 2.243* 0.863 0.362 0.138
CONSTANT -3.804 4.599
N = 143 AIC = 59.912 
Likelihood Ratio Test = 53.61 with 15 d.f.
Percentage of Right Predictions = 84.61 %
R2̂  =0.273; R2MF =0.379; R2MFA =0.305; R2vz =0.549
"■Estimates significant at a 90% confidence level (critical t-statistic =1.645)
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decision to offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. Negative coefficients attached to 
the variables ENVORG, EDUCATE, and DEPEND indicate that individuals who do not 
belong to environmental organizations, highly educated respondents, and wetland owners 
with more people living in their household are less likely to offer acres of wetlands for 
enrollment in the WRP.
The estimated coefficient for LNEP, the variable measuring respondents’ 
environmental attitudes via the NEP scale, is positive and significantly different from 
zero. Thus, as hypothesized for this model specification, the NEP-derived attitudinal 
measure is a meaningful explanatory factor for the evaluation of respondents’ decision 
to offer acres of wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. The greater the NEP-based score,
i.e., the more positive a respondent’s environmental attitude, the more inclined she is to 
offer to participate in the WHRP.
Changes in probabilities, also reported in Table 4.3, were comparable to those 
computed for the initial model. For example, increases in the probability to offer to 
participate in the WRP due to a change in income levels were 0.166 and 0.163 for the 
initial model and model including an NEP-derived attitude, respectively.
Values of the Akaike information criterion for the model with an NEP measure and 
the model based on the neoclassical approach suggest that the model with NEP slightly 
outperforms the initial model in explaining respondents’ decisions to offer to participate 
in the WRP. Calculated values of the AIC for the initial model and the model with NEP 
are 62.587 and 59.912, respectively.
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Behavioral Model with Attitude and Subjective Norm Measures 
The third Probit model estimated complements the neoclassical economic 
approach by including psychological constructs derived from the social psychological 
theory of reasoned action. Instead of the general environmental attitude measure 
considered in the NEP-based approach, this model specification uses specific measures 
of attitudes and subjective norm towards offering acres of wetlands for enrollment in the 
WRP. The behavioral economic model including attitude and subjective norm measures 
is:
OFFERWRP = F  (LTOTAL, LWET, REVENUE, KNOWRP, INFOWRP, 
WETFARM, CROP, ENVORG, GENDER, EDUCATE, 




LTOTAL (+ ) =
LWET (+ ) =
REVENUE ( - )  =
KNOWRP (+ ) =
INFOWRP (+ ) =
WETFARM (+ ) =
CROP ( + - )  =
(21)
1 if the wetland owner offered acres for enrollment in 
WRP; 0 otherwise
Total acreage owned (expressed in log form)
Acres of wetlands owned (expressed in log form)
1 if the respondent’s yearly average net return per acre 
increased or stayed the same; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent learned about the WRP from an 
extension service; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent has at least good knowledge about 
WRP; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent owns farmed wetlands; 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent grows soybeans; 0 otherwise
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ENVORG ( - )  =
GENDER ( + - ) =  
EDUCATE ( - )  =
RESIDE ( + - )  =
LAGE ( - )  =
DEPEND ( - )  =
INCOME ( - )  =
ATTITUDE (+ ) =
SUBNORM (+ ) =
92
1 if the respondent does not belongs to an environmental 
organization; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s gender; 1 if male; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s education level; 1 if at least attended 
college; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s residence; 1 if respondent resides in a city of 
more than 10,000 people; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s age (expressed in log form)
Number of persons living in respondent’s household
Respondent’s income; 1 if respondent’s annual income is 
greater or equal to $55,000; 0 otherwise
Respondent's attitude towards enrolling wetlands in the 
WRP
Respondent's subjective norm for enrolling wetlands in 
the WRP
Error term
The explanatory factors and the corresponding sign hypotheses, indicated in 
parentheses above, are consistent with the previous model specifications. ATTITUDE, 
the variable representing respondents’ attitudes towards enrolling wetlands in the WRP 
was computed based on respondents’ behavioral beliefs and belief evaluations elicited in 
the mail survey. Similarly, the assessment of wetland owners’ subjective norms was 
based on their normative beliefs and the associated motivations to comply with those 
beliefs. Questions eliciting behavioral and normative beliefs were scored using a 1 to 5 
unipolar scale. As suggested by Ajzen (1991), questions eliciting belief evaluations and
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motivations to comply were score based on a -2 to +2 bipolar scale. The attimriinai 
measure was obtained by summing the behavioral beliefs weighted by their associated 
evaluations. ATTITUDE, the variable included in this model, is the logged value of the 
attitudinal measure. The subjective norm variable, SUBNORM, was constructed via a 
weighted sum of normative beliefs and corresponding motivations to comply. The 
subjective norm variable was not logged because of the presence of a large number of 
negative values. Because all condition indexes obtained from the principal component 
analysis performed were inferior to 10, it was concluded that severe multicollinearity 
problems were not present within the variables used in this model. Condition numbers 
are reported in Appendix D.
It was hypothesized that positive attitudes towards enrolling wetlands in the WRP 
would significantly reinforce the decision to offer to participate in an environment- 
preserving program such as the Wetland Reserve Program. Thus, a positive sign was 
expected for ATTITUDE, the attitudinal variable. Due to the perceived beneficial effect 
of the WRP on wetlands preservation and restoration, a positive sign was also 
hypothesized for the measure of subjective norm, SUBNORM.
Estimation results, including coefficients, asymptotic standard errors, and changes 
in probabilities are presented in Table 4.3. The prediction success table is presented in 
Table B.3. The value of the calculated likelihood ratio test, 53.80 with 16 degrees of 
freedom, suggests that the model presented is, overall, significant at a 99 percent 
confidence level. The corresponding xz statistic is 32.0. The percentage of right 
predictions is 88.11 percent. As in previous model specifications, participation choices
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for respondents who offered to enroll in the WRP were more accurately predicted. The 
respective prediction success rates for respondents who offered to participate and those 
who did not offer to enroll in the WRP were 96.52 percent and 53.57 percent, 
respectively. Alternative R2 measures, also reported in Table 4.3, range from an Aldrich 
and Nelson R2 of 0.273 to a Veall and Zimmermann R2 of 0.549.
Coefficients for this model specification are consistent with parameter estimates 
obtained for the first two Probit models estimated. For example, the variables LWET, 
INFOWRP, WETFARM, ENVORG, EDUCATE, DEPEND, and INCOME are 
significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level. The positive 
relationship between the variables LWET, INFOWRP, WETFARM, and INCOME, 
suggests that information about the WRP, ownership of farmed wetlands, as well as high 
levels of income positively affect wetland owners’ decisions to offer to participate in the 
WRP.
However, different from previous models, RESIDE, the variable representing the 
place of residence of the wetland owner, is positive and significantly different from zero. 
This result suggests that, for this sample, wetland owners residing in cities of more than 
10,000 inhabitants are more likely to offer participation in the WRP than individuals 
residing in small towns. Although it did not affect the signs and order of magnitude of 
other significant parameters, the significance of the estimate for the variable RESIDE is 
problematic because it indicates the presence of model misspecification. The inclusion 
of economic variables such as benefits and opportunity costs associated with alternative
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Table 4.3
Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Behavioral Model with Measures 
of Attitude and Subjective Norm Derived from the Theory of Reasoned Action







LWET 0.200* 0.122 0.028 0.017
REVENUE 0.356 0.352
KNOWRP 0.415 0.357
INFOWRP 1.380* 0.363 0.194 0.050
WETFARM 0.775* 0.357 0.109 0.049
CROP -0.049 0.327
ENVORG -0.877* 0.432 -0.123 0.060
GENDER -0.933 0.592
EDUCATE -1.310* 0.508 -0.184 0.071
RESIDE 0.669* 0.402 0.094 0.056
LAGE -0.792 0.771
DEPEND -0.357* 0.156 -0.050 0.021
INCOME 0.905* 0.456 0.127 0.064
ATTITUDE 0.358* 0.179 0.050 0.025
SUBNORM 0.019 0.012
CONSTANT 4.912 3.479
N = 143 A1C = 60.815
Likelihood Ratio Test = 53.80 with 16 d.f.
Percentage of Right Predictions = 88.11 percent
R2an =0-273; R2MF =0.380; R2MFA =0.301; R2̂  =0.549
♦Estimates significant at a 95 percent confidence level (critical t-statistic =1.64)
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participation decisions may add the critical information omitted and resolve this issue. 
In this study, missing data precluded inclusion of this information in the models.
The parameter estimate for ATTITUDE, the variable measuring respondents’ 
attitudes towards offering wetlands for enrollment in the WRP, is positive and 
significantly different from zero at a confidence level o f 90 percent. Thus, as 
hypothesized, the more positive a respondent’s attitude towards offering wetlands for 
enrollment in the WRP, the more likely she would be to offer to participate in the WRP. 
The parameter for the subjective norm associated with the attitude towards offering to 
participate in the WRP, although positive, is not significantly different from zero. The 
non-significance of the SUBNORM parameter estimate suggests that, despite the 
perceived environment-improving quality of the WRP, social pressure does not constitute 
a relevant explanatory factor for the evaluation of wetland owners’ offers to participate 
in the WRP. The decision to offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP appears for this 
sample to be a privately based decision.
Calculated AIC values for the neoclassical model and the model including 
measures of attitude and subjective norm are 62.587 and 60.815, respectively. The model 
with attitude and subjective norm is thus preferred to the initial model. However, based 
on different R2 measures, the comparison of the two behavioral models estimated was 
inconclusive. The two models yielded comparable or equal R2's depending on the 
measure considered. For example, the Aldrich and Nelson’s and Veall and 
Zimmermann’s R2 measures were, for both models, 0.273 and 0.549, respectively.
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The Probit model based on the neoclassical economic approach as well as the two 
behavioral economic models including alternative attitudmai measures, overall, 
significantly explained the decision to offer to participate in the WRP. In the model 
specifications presented, the sign and magnitude of parameter estimates for the original 
explanatory variables initially included in the neoclassical economic model were 
consistent. A positive relationship was found between the decision to offer wetlands for 
enrollment in the WRP and the level of information about the WRP, the ownership of 
farmed wetlands, and income. Education and the number of people living in the 
respondent’s household were found to negatively influence the decision to offer 
participation in the WRP. Sensitivity analyses performed for different values of income 
and education showed that the sign of the influence of higher levels of education and 
income were invariant to the threshold value selected.
The NEP-based general environmental attitude and the specific computed attitude 
towards offering enrollment in the WRP were both found to be significant explanatory 
factors in the evaluation of wetland owners’ decision to offer to participate in the WRP. 
However, the respective percentage of right predictions and alternative R2 measures for 
the models presented suggest that the two models including attitudinal variables resulted 
in only a marginal improvement in the neoclassical model. The comparison between the 
behavioral economic model including psychological constructs derived from the theory 
of reasoned action and the model with the NEP measure was inconclusive because they 
yielded equivalent R2 measures.
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In following sections, a continuous representation of the participation decision 
variable is substituted for the initial dichctomcus expression of the decision to offer 
wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. The econometric approach corresponding to this 
approach, and estimation results are presented and discussed.
Tobit Models
Offers to participate, the dependent variable, is expressed in this section as a 
continuous, but censored variable. The number of acres of wetlands offered for 
enrollment in the WRP is used as an indicator of respondents’ level of participation in 
the WRP. Acres o f wetlands offered constitutes a censored variable because it either 
equals zero for respondents who did not offer any wetlands for enrollment or takes 
positive values for respondents who offered to enroll in the WRP. Censored regression 
or Tobit models are the appropriate class of econometric models to consider when the 
dependent variable is censored (Amemiya, 1984; Hellerstein, 1992). Censored 
regressions provide more information than dichotomous choice models. Contrary to 
binary choice models which only evaluate the participation decisions, censored 
regressions evaluate the level at which respondents offered wetlands for enrollment in 
the WRP.
Maximum likelihood estimation techniques are used to estimate the three models 
in this section. The log likelihood function is (Judge, et al., 1988):
L = E 0 In (1 ~F' )  -  (7y2) ln2iz -  (T/2) InO2 -  ( y -  x ' . p ^ O 2 (22)
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To allow comparison between parameter estimates, the normalized coefficients 
rather than the regression estimates are reported. Normalized coefficients are regression 
coefficients divided by the standard error of the estimate (White, 1993). A likelihood 
ratio test is also presented for each model. Expected values of marginal changes in the 
number of acres offered associated with changes in the explanatory factors are also 
reported. The expected value of the marginal effect of a regressor X; on the number of 
acres of wetlands offered is expressed as (McDonald and Moffit, 1980; Shapiro, Brorsen, 
and Doster, 1992):
^  -  « * £ >  P, (23)
I
The cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, vectors of sample means 
and normalized coefficients, and the estimate for the ith regressor are represented by F, 
X, p/o, and P-,, respectively. Standard errors associated with calculated marginal effects 
were obtained by linear approximation, i.e., via scaling the parameter estimates’ standard 
errors by a factor equal to F(X p/o).
The pseudo-R2 proposed for limited dependent variables by Laitila (1993) is 
offered as a goodness-of-fit measure due to its reliability for Tobit models (Windmeijer, 
1995). Laitila’s pseudo-R2 measure is given by:
P ' E  P
P seu d o -R 2 = ----------------  (24)
to2 * P' £  P>
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The vector of parameter estimates, sample covariance matrix of the regressors, and 
variance of the estimate are represented by (5, Ez , and o2 , respectively. The pseudo-R2 
can be interpreted as the proportion of explained variation of the dependent variable 
(Laitila, 1993) and thus, lies within the interval [0, 1].
As in the previous section, three models were estimated. A neoclassical 
economic-based model, a behavioral economic model with an NEP-derived 
environmental attitude measure, and a behavioral economic model including measures 
of attitudes and subjective norm derived from the theory of reasoned action were 
estimated.
Neoclassical Economic Model
Within the neoclassical economic framework, the initial model specification 
evaluates the relationship between the number of acres offered by respondents for 
enrollment in the WRP and economic and socio-economic variables. The basic Tobit 
neoclassical model is:
LACWRP =  F  (LTOTAL, LWET, REVENUE, KNOWRP, INFOWRP, WETFARM, 
CROP, ENVORG, GENDER, EDUCATE, RESIDE, LAGE, DEPEND, 
INCOME, e) (25)
where:
LACWRP Log of the number of acres of wetlands offered by the 
respondent for enrollment in the WRP
LTOTAL (+ ) = Total acreage owned (expressed in log form)
LWET (+ ) = Acres of wetlands owned (expressed in log form)
REVENUE ( - )  = 1 if the respondent’s yearly average net return per acre 
increased or stayed the same; 0 otherwise
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KNOWRP (+ ) =
INFOWRP (+ ) =
WETFARM (+ ) =
CROP ( + - )  =
ENVORG ( - )  =
GENDER ( + - )  =
EDUCATE ( - )  =
RESIDE ( + - )  =
LAGE ( - )  =
DEPEND ( - )  =
INCOME ( - )  =
1 if the respondent learned about the WRP from an 
extension service; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent has at least a good knowledge about 
WRP; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent owns fanned wetlands; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent grows soybeans; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent does not belongs to an environmental 
organization; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s gender; 1 if male; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s education level; 1 if at least attended 
college; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s residence; 1 if respondent resides in a 
medium or large city of more than 10,000 people; 0 
otherwise
Respondent’s age (expressed in log form)
Number of persons living in respondent’s household
Respondent’s income; 1 if respondent’s annual income is 
greater or equal to $55,000; 0 otherwise
Error term
For this model specification, regressors, and hypothesized signs, indicated in 
parentheses, are consistent with the neoclassical Probit model. Estimation results, 
including the value of the likelihood ratio test, normalized coefficients, standard errors, 
and marginal effects are reported in Table 4.4.
The likelihood ratio test suggests that, at a level of confidence of 99 percent, the 
model estimated significantly explains the variation in the number of acres of wetlands
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offered for enrollment in the WRP. The value of the LR test and the critical x2 statistic 
are 177.12 with 14 degrees of freedom and 29.14, respectively. The pseudo-R2, the 
calculated goodness-of-fit measure, indicates that this model explains 26.5 percent of the 
variation in the number of acres of wetlands offered for enrollment in the WRP
At a 90 percent confidence level, parameter estimates for LWET, INFOWRP, 
WETFARM, and INCOME are significantly different from zero. Signs of significant 
estimates are consistent with the a priori hypotheses formulated. Positive coefficients are 
associated with the variables LWET, INFOWRP, WETFARM, and INCOME, 
representing the acreage of wedands owned, the level of information about the WRP, the 
ownership of farmed wedands, and income, respectively. Thus, the number of acres of 
wedands offered for enrollment in the WRP increases with the acreage of wedands 
owned, the level of information about the WRP, the ownership of farmed wedands, and, 
the level of income. Changes in the number of acres of wedands offered due to changes 
in the explanatory factors are also presented in Table 4.4. For example, the marginal 
effect on the number of acres offered of a unit change in LWET, the variable 
representing the acreage of wedands owned, is 0.141.
Behavioral Model with NEP Measure
This model specification added an NEP-derived attitude measure to the basic 
Tobit model presented in equation (25). The behavioral model explaining the number of 
acres of wedands offered for enrollment in the WRP using the NEP-based environmental 
attitude is:
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Table 4.4
Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Neoclassical Economic Model






LWET 0.150* 0.078 0.141 0.073
REVENUE 0.188 0.191
KNOWRP 0.054 0.187
INFOWRP 0.559* 0.192 0.527 0.181








INCOME 0.416* 0.238 0.392 0.224
CONSTANT 0.780 1.0964 --------
N = 143
Likelihood Ratio Test = 177.12 with 14 d.f.
Pseudo-R2 = 0.265
"■Estimates significant at a 90 percent confidence level (critical t-statistic= 1.645)
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LACWRP =  F  (LTOTAL, LWET, REVENUE, KNOWRP, INFOWRP, WETFARM, 
CROP, ENVORG, GENDER, EDUCATE, RESIDE, LAGE, DEPEND, 
INCOME, LNEP, e) (26)
where:
LACWRP =  Log of the number of acres of wetlands offered by the
respondent for enrollment in the WRP
LTOTAL (+ ) =  Total acreage owned (expressed in log form)
LWET (+ )  =  Acres of wetlands owned (expressed in log form)
REVENUE ( - )  =  1 if the respondent’s yearly average net return per acre
increased or stayed the same; 0 otherwise
KNOWRP (+ ) =  1 if the respondent learned about the WRP from an
extension service; 0 otherwise
INFOWRP (+ ) =  1 if the respondent has at least a good knowledge about
WRP; 0 otherwise
WETFARM (+ ) = 1 if the respondent owns farmed wetlands; 0 otherwise
CROP ( + -  ) =  1 if respondent grows soybeans; 0 otherwise
ENVORG ( - ) =  1 if the respondent does not belongs to an environmental
organization; 0 otherwise
GENDER ( + - )  =  Respondent’s gender; 1 if male; 0 otherwise
EDUCATE ( - )  =  Respondent’s education level; 1 if at least attended
college; 0 otherwise
RESIDE ( + - )  =  Respondent’s residence; 1 if respondent resides in a city of
more than 10,000 people; 0 otherwise
LAGE ( - ) =  Respondent’s age (expressed in log form)
DEPEND ( - )  = Number of persons living in respondent’s household
INCOME ( - ) =  Respondent’s income; 1 if respondent’s annual income is
greater or equal to $55,000; 0 otherwise
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LNEP (+ ) =  Respondent’s environmental attitude measured by the log
value of his NEP score
6 =  Error term
Parameter estimates and the corresponding sign hypotheses are consistent with 
the model presented in equation (25). Normalized coefficients, asymptotic standard 
errors, and marginal changes in the number of acres of wetlands offered due to changes 
in the explanatory variables are reported in Table 4.5. Values of the likelihood ratio test 
and the critical x2 statistic, 186.76 with 15 degrees of freedom and 30.58, respectively, 
indicate that the model estimated is, overall, significant at a confidence level of 99 
percent. The pseudo-R2, with a value of 0.30, suggests that the model explains 30 
percent of the variation in the number of acres of wetlands offered for enrollment.
Coefficients for LWET, INFOWRP, WETFARM, ENVORG, and LNEP, the 
variables representing the acreage of wetlands owned, level of information about the 
program, ownership of farmed wetlands, belonging to an environmental organization, 
and environmental attitude, respectively, are significantly different from zero at a 90 
percent confidence level. For significant variables, signs of the normalized coefficients 
support hypotheses formulated about the influence of explanatory factors considered on 
the number of acres of wetlands offered for enrollment.
The positive sign of the parameter associated with LNEP, the variable measuring 
the NEP-based environmental attitude, supports the hypothesis that positive 
environmental attitudes have a significant and positive influence on the number of acres
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offered. A unit increase in LNEP yields a 1.415 marginal increase in the number of acres
offered for enrollment in the WRP.
Behavioral Model with Attitudes and Subjective Norm Measures
This model complements the specification based on the neoclassical economic
approach, presented in equation (25), with psychological constructs derived from the
theory of reasoned action. The Tobit model, including measures of respondents’ attitude
and subjective norm towards offering wetlands for enrollment in the WRP, is:
LACWRP =  F  (LTOTAL, LWET, REVENUE, KNOWRP, INFOWRP, WETFARM, 
CROP, ENVORG, GENDER, EDUCATE, RESIDE, AGE, DEPEND, 
INCOME, ATTITUDE, SUBNORM, e) (27)
where:
LACWRP
LTOTAL (+ ) =
LWET (+) =
REVENUE ( - )  =
KNOWRP (+ ) =
INFOWRP (+ ) =
WETFARM (+ ) =
CROP ( + - )  =
ENVORG ( - )  =
Log of the number of acres of wetlands offered by the 
respondent for enrollment in the WRP
Total acreage owned (expressed in log form)
Acres of wetlands owned (expressed in log form)
1 if the respondent’s yearly average net return per acre 
increased or stayed the same; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent learned about the WRP from an 
extension service; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent has at least a good knowledge about the 
WRP; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent owns farmed wetlands; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent grows soybeans; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent does not belongs to an environmental 
organization; 0 otherwise
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Table 4.5
Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Behavioral Model with NEP






LW ET 0.141* 0.078 0.136 0.075
REVENUE 0.158 0.198
KNOWRP -0.027 0.190
INFOWRP 0.556* 0.192 0.538 0.185
WETFARM 0.519* 0.198 0.502 0.191
CROP 0.176 0.185







LNEP 1.462* 0.463 1.415 0.448
CONSTANT -4.99 2.167
N = 143
Likelihood Ratio Test = 186.76 
Pseudo-R2 = 0.30
♦Estimates significant at a 90 percent confidence level (critical t-statistic = 1.645)
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GENDER ( + - )  =  
EDUCATE ( - )  =
RESIDE ( + - )  =
LAGE ( - )  =
DEPEND ( - )  =
INCOME (+ )  =
ATTITUDE (+ )  =
SUBNORM (+ )  =
Respondent’s gender; 1 if male; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s education level; 1 if at least attended 
college; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s residence; 1 if respondent resides in a city of 
more than 10,000 people; 0 otherwise
Respondent’s age (expressed in log form)
Number of persons living in respondent’s household
Respondent’s income; 1 if respondent’s annual income is 
greater or equal to $55,000; 0 otherwise
Respondent's attitude towards enrolling wetlands in the 
WRP
Respondent's subjective norm for enrolling wetlands in 
the WRP
Error term
Regressors used in this specification and associated sign hypotheses are consistent 
with the model presented in equation (25). The calculated likelihood ratio test, pseudo-R2 
and estimation results, including normalized coefficients, standard errors, and marginal 
changes are reported in Table 4.6. The likelihood ratio test, with a calculated value of 
179.84 with 16 degrees of freedom, indicates that, at a level of significance of 99 
percent, the model presented is, overall significant. The corresponding critical %2 statistic 
is 32.0. As suggested by a calculated pseudo-R2 of 0.28, the model explains 28 percent 
of the variation in the number of acres offered for enrollment in the WRP.
At a 90 percent confidence level, normalized coefficients for LWET, INFOWRP, 
WETFARM, and RESIDE are significantly different from zero. This indicates that, for
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Table 4.6
Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Behavioral Model with Measures 
of Attitude and Subjective Norm Derived from the Theory of Reasoned Action






LWET 0.139* 0.078 0.131 0.073
REVENUE 0.211 0.192
KNOWRP 0.088 0.189
INFOWRP 0.590* 0.194 0.557 0.183













Likelihood Ratio Test = 179.84 
Pseudo-R2 = 0.28
* Estimates significant at a 90 percent confidence level (critical t-stadstic= 1.645)
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this model specification, variables representing the acreage of wetlands owned, the level 
of information about the WRP, the ownership of fanned wetlands, and the place of 
residence of the respondents are the only significant factors in explaining the extent to 
which wetland owners offer participation in the WRP. The positive sign of these 
parameter estimates implies that they have a positive influence on the number of acres 
offered for enrollment in the WRP.
Contrary to hypotheses formulated, parameter estimates for the psychological 
constructs included in this model, although positive, are not significantly different from 
zero. Thus, for this model, measures of attitude and subjective norm derived from the 
theory of reasoned action are not meaningful in explaining the level to which wetland 
owners offered to participate in the WRP 
Summary
This chapter has presented a general conceptual model based on the theoretical 
framework for the evaluation of choice behavior developed in Chapter 3. Data required 
to empirically evaluate the conceptual model were obtained through a mail survey of a 
sample of 767 Louisiana wetland owners. The mail survey, which was administered 
following guidelines suggested by Dillman’s Total Design Method, gathered information 
on wetland owners’ land, level of information about the WRP, degree of participation 
in the WRP, environmental attitudes, and socio-economic characteristics.
Three alternative formulations of the general conceptual model were derived to 
analyze wetland owners’ decisions to offer to participate in the WRP or to explain the 
rate at which they offered to participate. Wetland owners’ decisions to offer to participate
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in the WRP were evaluated using a Probit approach. The rate at which wetland owners 
offered to participate in the WRP was explained Yia a Tobit, or censored regression, 
approach.
Maximum likelihood was used to estimate three empirical models evaluating 
wetland owners’ decisions to offer to participate in the WRP. A model based on the 
neoclassical economic approach to choice behavior, i.e., a model considering economic 
variables and socio-economic characteristics of respondents was initially estimated. Two 
models, extending the initial model by including either an NEP-based environmental 
attitude measure or measures, derived from the theory of reasoned action, of attitudes 
and subjective norm towards offering wetlands for enrollment in the WRP were also 
estimated. At a 99 percent confidence level, the three Probit models estimated were, 
overall, significant in explaining the variation observed in wetland owners’ decisions to 
offer to participate in the WRP.
Across the three specifications, t-ratios indicated that at a 90 percent confidence 
level, parameter estimates for variables representing the acreage of wetlands owned, the 
level of information about the WRP, the ownership of farmed wetlands, the respondents’ 
involvement in environmental organizations, education level, income, and the number 
of people living in the household were significant factors in explaining the decision to 
offer enrollment in the WRP. Signs of the estimates suggested that, apart from the level 
of education and the number of people in the respondents’ household which had a 
negative effect on the probability to offer participation in the WRP, significant factors 
positively influenced wetland owners’ decisions to offer to participate in the WRP.
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Changes in the threshold values for education and income did not affect the signs of the 
influence of these explanatory factors on the decision to offer to participate in the WRP.
Coefficients for variables representing the NEP-based environmental attitude as 
well as the calculated attitude towards offering to participate in the WRP were significant 
and positive. Consistent with hypotheses formulated, positive environmental attitudes 
increased the likelihood of offering to participate in the WRP.
The representation of the choice dependent variable as a continuous, but censored, 
variable warranted the use of a Tobit maximum likelihood estimation in evaluating the 
rate at which landowners offered to participate in the WRP. The substitution of the 
number of acres of wetlands offered for the binary variable expressing the offer to 
participate yielded three additional model specifications.
At a 99 percent confidence level, likelihood ratio tests suggested that, overall, the 
three Tobit models estimated were significant. As indicated by the pseudo-R2, the model 
with an NEP-derived environmental attitude measure was the most effective in evaluating 
the observed variation in the number of acres of wetlands offered for enrollment in the 
WRP. The acreage of wetlands owned, the level of information about the program, and 
the ownership of farmed wetlands were consistently significant and positive explanatory 
factors across models. The positive influence of the respondents’ income level on the 
number of acres of wetlands offered was only significant for the initial model based on 
the neoclassical economic approach.
The model including an NEP-derived environmental attitude measure supported 
the hypothesis that positive environmental attitudes significantly and positively influenced
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the number of acres offered for participation. However, for the model with attitudinal 
measures derived from the theory of reasoned action, attitudes and subjective norm were 
not significant in evaluating the number of acres of wetlands offered for enrollment in 
the WRP.
Empirical results presented support the multi-disciplinary conceptual approach 
upon which the behavioral models estimated are based. These models, which include 
attitude measures as additional independent variables, were slightly more effective in 
explaining wetland owners’ choice behavior. This marginal increase in the predictive 
ability of the neoclassical economic model suggests that, despite the significance of 
attitudinal variables, economic factors constitute the primary decision variables for 
potential participants in voluntary conservation programs such as the WRP.
However, results presented do not provide a conclusive answer to the comparison 
between the alternative attitude assessment approaches selected in this study. Although 
psychological constructs based on the theory of reasoned action are more soundly 
grounded in social psychology, the inconclusiveness in the comparison between the NEP- 
based general measure of environmental attitude and the specific measures derived from 
the theory of reasoned action may suggest that these alternative attitude measures could 
be used interchangeably when evaluating offers to participate in the WRP.
The final chapter provides a summary of this research and draws conclusions 
suggested by the empirical results obtained. The fifth chapter also offers policy 
recommendations based on the empirical results. In addition, suggestions for future 
research are discussed.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Historically, environmental management in the United States has primarily used 
a direct regulatory, or command and control, approach. The two classes of instruments 
used under the regulatory approach include technology-based and performance-based 
standards. The gradual realization of the limitations o f direct regulation, including 
enforcement difficulties, inherent inefficiencies, and the lack of incentives for 
technological improvement has led to the consideration of an alternative framework for 
environmental management. This search for alternative environmental management 
instruments has resulted in an increased interest in incentive-based mechanisms. The 
evolution of environmental management in agriculture followed a different course.
Until the 1985 Farm Bill, agriculture benefited from an implicit exemption from 
regulation. During this period, self-regulation constituted the main strategy adopted to 
mitigate environmental problems stemming from the agricultural sector. As a result of 
the growing awareness of agriculture-related damages to the environment, cross­
compliance methods were substituted for the prevailing self-regulatory approach. Under 
the cross-compliance approach, regulators began to tie government benefits to the 
adoption of specific conservation and restoration programs such as the Sodbuster 
Program. In agriculture, incentive-based mechanisms formed the third generation of 
environmental management tools. Although they evolved following different paths over
114
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time, environmental management in general and environmental policy in agriculture both 
currently rely on an increased utilization of incentive-based mechanisms. 
Incentive-based mechanisms
Incentive-based mechanisms, or market-based incentive programs, are voluntary 
environmental management instruments based on free market environmentalism. Free 
market environmentalism is an alternative environmental management framework that 
attempts to harness market forces and uses them to address environmental problems. This 
market approach to environmental issues neither possesses the enforcement difficulties 
and inherent economic efficiencies of direct regulation nor requires the information 
centralization indispensable to the implementation of command and control guidelines. 
Theoretically, free market environmentalism is conducive to economically optimal 
solutions to environmental problems.
The wide array of incentive-based instruments can be classified into two broad 
categories, taxes (or subsidies), and tradable permits (or rights). Applications of 
incentive-based mechanisms include the control of air pollutants using tax incentives, the 
management of fishing grounds via individual transferable quotas, state and local 
farmland retention programs through transfers or purchases of development rights, and, 
federal soil conservation programs such as the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP). The 
WRP is a federal policy instrument directed towards wetlands protection. Conceptually 
similar to the purchase of development right programs, the WRP restores and preserves 
wetlands by offering a financial compensation, determined after appraisal of the wetland
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value, to wetlands owners who are willing to place their property under a perpetual 
easement.
Applications of IBM’s to environmental management are still hampered. Due to 
the voluntary nature of incentive-based environmental programs, acceptance and thus 
participation in these programs are not automatic. Reasons for the limited use of IBM’s 
include a pervasive mistrust of market forces in dealing with environmental issues. 
Attitudes towards the use of market forces in environmental policy may therefore play 
a determining role in the successful implementation of incentive-based mechanisms. 
Based on the limited understanding of the influence of attitudes in market-based program 
participation, this research explored the role of environmental attitudes in incentive-based 
environmental management programs.
Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this study was to evaluate the role of attitudes in the 
decision to participate in incentive-based environmental management programs. This 
research was specifically designed to: (I) develop a conceptual framework which extends 
the neoclassical economic approach to choice behavior by including psychological 
constructs; (ii) propose a behavioral model to explain participation in incentive-based 
environmental management programs; (iii) empirically test the behavioral model 
proposed using the Wetland Reserve Program in Louisiana; and, (iv) offer policy 
recommendations for the improvement of future market-based programs. Procedures used 
to achieve these objectives and empirical results obtained are summarized in the 
following sections.
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Conceptual Framework
The development of a multi-disciplinary framework for the evaluation of choice 
behavior was accomplished by complementing a traditional utility maximization approach 
used in neoclassical economics by adding psychological constructs. The two classes of 
explanatory factors used in the neoclassical economic approach to evaluating choice 
behavior are economic variables and socio-economic characteristics of the choice maker.
The theory of reasoned action and the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) 
provided the theoretical foundations for the derivation of alternative attitudinal measures 
used to extend the basic neoclassical model. Constructs derived from the theory of 
reasoned action included specific measures of wetland owners’ attitude towards offering 
wetlands for enrollment in the WRP and the associated subjective norm. The subjective 
norm is, in this case, a measure of the social pressure exerted on the decision maker to 
enroll in the WRP. The NEP-derived attitude, a general indicator of wetland owners’ 
attitude towards the environment, was based on the standard NEP scale. The behavioral 
economic approach taken in developing the conceptual framework discussed in this 
research combined economic variables and socio-economic attributes of the decision 
makers with alternative attitudinal constructs.
Theoretical Model
A theoretical model was proposed based on the conceptual framework developed. 
In addition to economic variables and socio-economic characteristics of the decision 
maker, the two classes of explanatory factors traditionally used in choice behavior 
evaluation, the theoretical model included attitudinal measures as a third class of
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explanatory factors. Representation of the choice dependent variable determined the 
econometric method used to specify empirical models. The dependent variable was either 
represented by a discrete or by a continuous, but restricted, variable.
Empirical Tests
Models in which the choice variable, representing landowners’ decision to offer 
wetlands for enrollment in the WRP, was expressed as a dichotomous variable were 
estimated via the Probit maximum likelihood approach. An initial probit model based on 
the neoclassical approach to choice behavior, a model including an NEP-derived 
environmental attitude measure, and a model complementing the neoclassical approach 
with psychological constructs derived from the theory of reasoned action were the three 
probit models estimated.
In the second class of empirical models estimated, the dependent variable, 
expressing the extent to which landowners offered wetlands for enrollment in the WRP, 
was represented by the number of acres of wetlands offered for enrollment in the WRP. 
These models were specified as Tobit, or censored regressions and were estimated using 
a maximum likelihood approach. The substitution of the acreage of wetlands offered for 
enrollment in the WRP for the binary variable expressing wetland owners’ decisions to 
offer participation in the WRP yielded three additional model specifications.
Data used to evaluate the six models specified were collected through a mail 
survey of Louisiana wetland owners. The mail survey was conducted in accordance with 
the guidelines of the Dillman’s Total Design method. Out of the 767 surveys mailed, 174 
completed surveys were returned, yielding an overall response rate of 22.7 percent.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
119
However, due to item non-responses, only 143 surveys were used in the empirical 
analysis. The mail survey gathered data on wetland owners’ land, level of information 
about the Wetland Reserve Program, degree of participation in the WRP, environmental 
attitudes, and socio-economic attributes.
Probit Models
The three models estimated, overall, significantly explained wetland owners’ 
decisions to offer to participate in the WRP. While the three models correctly predicted 
over 90 percent of the participation decisions for wetland owners who offered to enroll 
in the WRP, they accurately predicted about 50 percent of the choices made by 
respondents who did not offer to participate. This low prediction success may be due to 
the limited number of respondents who did not offer acres of wetlands for enrollment in 
the WRP. As suggested by the respective Akaike information criteria, R2 measures, and 
percentage of right predictions, the model including psychological constructs derived 
from the theory of reasoned action marginally improved the predictive ability of the basic 
model. The same performance criteria indicated that the model with the NEP-derived 
attitudinal measure only yielded a small increase in the predictive ability of the basic 
model. The model with the NEP-based attitudinal measure as well as the model including 
measures derived from the theory of reasoned action supported the hypothesis that pro- 
environmental, or positive, attitudes increase the probability to offer to enroll in the 
WRP. However, comparison between the two behavioral models presented was 
inconclusive.
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Explanatory factors such as the acreage of wetlands owned, the level of 
information about the WRP, the ownership of fanned wetlands, respondents’ 
involvement in environmental organizations, and income had a significant and positive 
influence on the decision to offer participation in the WRP. Respondents’ education level, 
and number of people living in the household had an adverse effect on the likelihood to 
offer wetlands for enrollment in the WRP. Consistent with a priori hypotheses, positive 
environmental attitudes increased wetland owners’ propensity to offer participation in the 
Wetland Reserve Program.
Tobit Models
Likelihood ratio tests suggested that all three Tobit models estimated were, 
overall, significant in explaining the variation observed in the number of acres of 
wetlands offered by respondents for enrollment in the WRP. The specification which 
included an NEP-based environmental attitude measure was relatively more effective in 
explaining variations in the acreage of wetlands offered for enrollment in the WRP. 
Consistent with the Probit models discussed above, the acreage of wetlands owned, the 
level of information about the program, and the ownership of farmed wetlands were 
found to significantly increase respondents’ likelihood to offer wetlands for enrollment 
in the WRP. The model including an NEP-derived attitudinal measure supported the 
hypothesis that positive environmental attitudes significantly enhances the likelihood to 
offer participation in the WRP. However, for the model including attitudinal constructs 
based on the theory of reasoned action, neither the attitude nor the subjective norm
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measures were significant factors in explaining the rate at which wetland owners offered 
participation in the WRP.
Conclusions
Environmental management in the United States increasingly relies on the use of 
voluntary environmental management instruments such as incentive-based mechanisms 
The growing interest in the use of incentive-based mechanisms offers a unique 
opportunity to efficiently correct agriculture-related environmental problems and bring 
agriculture in line with mainstream environmental management
The multi-disciplinary framework proposed in this research to evaluate choice 
behavior including participation choices in IBM programs such as the Wetland Reserve 
Program suggests that neoclassical economics may benefit from the inclusion of 
instruments and concepts used in other social sciences like social psychology. The 
addition of psychological constructs may conceptually improve the traditional 
neoclassical economic approach to evaluating choice behavior by allowing the 
consideration of well established determinants of behavior such as attitudes.
Empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that environmental attitudes 
play a significant role in explaining wetland owners’ decision to offer to participate in 
the WRP. Positive environmental attitudes were found to increase the likelihood to 
participate as well as the participation rate. However, behavioral model specifications 
including attitudinal measures only yielded marginal improvements in the predictive 
ability of the basic model based on the neoclassical economic approach. In designing mail 
surveys to evaluate participation in incentive-based programs, the trade-off between the
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additional cost resulting from the collection of attitudinal variables and the marginal 
benefits they yield has to be considered. These marginal improvements in the predictive 
ability of the basic model may also imply that, for programs with widely disseminated 
information such as the WRP, the role of attitudes in the decision process becomes 
secondary. Conversely, for new or proposed programs with limited information available 
to potential participants, attitudes may play a more noticeable role in the decision 
process.
An important limitation of this study can be attributed to issues associated with 
the data. Out of the 174 surveys returned, only 143 observations were used in the 
empirical analysis due to item non-responses. In addition, 80.4 percent of the surveys 
used were collected from wetland owners who offered to participate in the WRP. This 
under representation of respondents who did not offer to participate in the WRP may 
have affected the prediction success rates of the models. Finally, missing values in the 
data collected precluded the use of economic variables such as benefits and opportunity 
costs of alternative participation choices as explanatory factors.
Policy Implications
The effective implementation and success of future incentive-based environmental 
management programs rest on getting all the incentives “right”, including economic 
incentives and attitudinal concerns. Policy makers may consider, in the early stages of 
an IBM, campaigns geared towards increasing environmental awareness or improving 
predisposition towards a specific environmental management program as an additional 
instrument to foster the successful implementation of incentive-based programs.
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However, as information about the incentive-based program becomes more widespread, 
policy makers should only consider the provision of additional economic incentives to 
significantly increase participation. As a result of the recent modification of the easement 
period from permanent to thirty years, policy makers should concentrate their efforts on 
younger wetland owners to maximize the chances of contract renewal.
Future Research
Future evaluation of landowners’ participation in an incentive-based program such 
as the WRP may include economic variables accurately measuring benefits and 
opportunity costs associated with respondents’ decisions. The assessment of the influence 
of attitudes on participation decisions may be extended to other voluntary environmental 
programs. New incentive-based programs, for which information has not been fully 
disseminated to the potential participants, may offer interesting applications. Because the 
comparison between the alternative attitude measurement approaches considered was 
inconclusive, further evaluation of the relative effectiveness of these two approaches to 
assessing environmental attitudes is warranted. The use of a geographical information 
system to geo-reference plots enrolled in the Wetland Reserve Program and the 
consideration of spatial correlation in the analysis of participation decisions may also 
constitute an area of future research.
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APPENDIX A.1 
Correspondence Sent to Wetland Owners
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Louisiana State University
Agricultural Center
W t—3 13 Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station
February 6, 1996
Dear Wetland Owner;
Louisiana’s wetlands are one of our state’s greatest resources. Protection of wetlands has 
become a priority at the state and national levels. One program recently initiated to help 
preserve wetlands is the Wetland Reserve Program. Louisiana was one of a select group of 
states chosen to participate in this wetland conservation program. Now that it has been in 
place as a pilot program for a few years, it is important to determine wetland owners’ 
knowledge of the program and identify trends influencing participation in the program.
The Louisiana State University Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 
requests your assistance in examining the Wetland Reserve Program in Louisiana. You are 
among a selected group of Louisiana wetland owners chosen for participation in this study. For 
this study to be truly representative, it is important that this questionnaire be completed and 
returned by you.
You may be assured of complete confidentiality. The identification number that appears on the 
questionnaire is for mailing purposes only, allowing us to check your name off of the mailing 
list when your questionnaire is returned. You can receive a summary of the final results of this 
survey by writing “results requested” on the back of the return envelope and printing your 
name and address below it. Please do not put this information on the questionnaire.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the questionnaire. 
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by calling 
the LSU research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
E. Jane Luzar 
Professor
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Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 
101 Agricultural Administration Building 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5604 




Recently a questionnaire seeking information about wetlands and the Wetland 
Reserve Program in Louisiana was mailed to you. This card is a reminder to 
please 611 out the questionnaire. If you have already completed it and returned it 
to us, please accept our thanks. If not, please do so today. It is extremely 
important that your questionnaire be completed and returned by you so that the 
results of this study will be truly representative. If by some chance you did not 
receive the questionnaire or it has been misplaced, please call me at (504) 388- 
2763 and another will be sent to you immediately.
Sincerely,
Dr. E. Jane Luzar 
Professor
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Louisiana State University Department of Agricultural Economics and AgiflMsinass
*»gfHeti« lUffli WCfltGr Louisiana State Univenity
C-/r ft-J Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station Baton Rouge, LA 70303-5604




About a month ago I mailed a questionnaire to you seeking information about your Inuiyjana 
wetlands. As of today, I have not received your completed questionnaire.
I am writing to you again because of the importance each questionnaire has to this research. 
Your name was chosen for this study through a process in which all wetland owners in 
Louisiana had a chance of being selected. In order for the results of this study to be truly 
representative, it is important that you complete and return the questionnaire.
Another copy of the Louisiana Wetlands Survey questionnaire has been enclosed in case your 
original copy has been misplaced. Your answers to the questionnaire will be held in complete 
confidence and used only for the purpose of this study.
If you have already completed and mailed your questionnaire, please disregard this reminder 
and accept our thanks for participating in this study.
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by calling 
the LSU research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
E. Jane Luzar 
Professor
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Section I- INFORMATION ABOUT THE WETLAND RESERVE PROGRAM (WRP)
In this first section, we would like to learn about your knowledge of the Wetland 
Reserve Program (WRP).
Q -l Are you aware of the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP)? (circle number)
1 Yes 2 No (If No, Please skip to Q-4)
Q-2 How did you learn about the WRP? (circle number)
1 Extension Service
2 Media: magazine, TV or radio
3 Neighbors, friends or family
4 Other (please specify)_________________
Q-3 How would you rank your knowledge about the WRP? (circle number)
1 Excellent 3 Fair
2 Good 4 Poor
Section II- INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR LAND
In this section, we would like to learn about your land and some of its uses.
Q-4 How many total acres o f agricultural and non-agricultural land do you own? 
_____________________acres
Q-5 How many acres of agricultural land do you own?
acres
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Q-6 How many acres o f wetlands (both natural and restored) do you own?
  acres
Q-7 What type o f wetlands do you own? (circle only one number)






Q-8 In what parish(es) are your wetlands located?
Q-9 How long have you owned the wetlands? 
_____________________years
Q-10 How many acres of wetlands have you converted to agriculture in the last 15 years?
acres
Q-l 1 How many acres of wetlands have you converted to uses other than agriculture in 
the last 15 years?
acres
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Q-13 What is the main crop that you grow on the wetlands you converted to 






Q-14 How many people help you in farming your land? (indicate the number)
1 Family members____________  2 Outside Hired labor____________
Q -l5 What is the yearly average gross revenue per acre earned from your wetlands 
(converted and non-converted)?
Q -l6 What is the yearly average net revenue per acre earned from your wetlands 
(converted and non-converted)?
Q-17 How would you characterize the changes in your yearly average net revenue per 
acre in the past five years? (circle number)
1 Increase 2 Same 3 Decrease
Q-18 What are your future plans overall for the wetlands you currently own? 
number)
1 Develop the land 5
2 Sell at fair market value 6
3 Convert to agriculture 7
4 Rent or lease 8
enroll in a government program 
Leave idle 
Pass on to family 
Other (Please specify)
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Your answers to this section will allow us to learn more about your decision 
process regarding participating in the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP).
Q-19 Did you offer to enroll any of your land in the Wetland Reserve Program? (circle 
one number)
1 Yes 2 No (if No, please skip to Q-29)









_ per acre in 1992 
_ per acre in 1994 
_per acre in 1995
Q-22 Did you enroll any of your wetlands in the Wetland Reserve Program as a result of 
any of the sign-ups ? (circle number)
1 Yes 2 No (if No, please skip to Q-29)
Q-23 How many acres of wetlands did you enroll in the WRP?
in 1992 in 1994 in 1995
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Q-24 In what parish(es) are the enrolled acres o f wetlands located?
148
Q-25 What is the main crop grown on the wetlands you offered or enrolled in WRP? 
(circle only one number)
1 Soybeans 4 Cotton
2 Rice 5 Com
3 Sorghum
Q-26 If the number of acres offered is different from the number o f acres you did enroll, 
how would you best explain the difference? (circle number)
1 All the acres were not eligible 3 I changed my mind
2 The payment was too low 4 Other______________
Q-27 How much money did you receive (or have been offered) per acre enrolled?
$____________________ per acre in 1992
$____________________ per acre in 1994
$ per acre in 1995
Q-28 What was the primary factor that determined your decision to participate in the 
WRP? (circle one number)
1 Economic factors
2 Environmental factors
3 Economic and environmental factors
4 Other (please specify)__________________
Q-29 What was the primary factor that made you decide not to participate in the WRP? 
(circle one number)
1 Not enough economic incentives
2 The permanent nature of the easement
3 Hesitation to sell development rights to the government
4 Other (please specify)__________________________
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In this section, we would like to learn about your attitudes towards the 
environment in general, as well as your attitudes towards programs such as the 
Wetland Reserve Program (WRP).
Q-30 Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements 
about the environment (mark the most appropriate column). SA= Strongly Agree, 
A=Agree, U= Uncertain, D= Disagree, SD= Strongly Disagree.
SA A U D SD
1 We are approaching the limit of the
number of people the earth can support. __ __ __ __ __
2 Humans have the right to modify the natural 
environment to suit their needs.
3 When humans interfere with nature it 
often produces disastrous consequences.
4 Human ingenuity will ensure that we do NOT 
make the earth untivable.
5 Humans are severely abusing the environment.
6 The earth has plenty of natural resources if 
we just learn how to develop them.
7 Plants and animals have as much right as 
humans to exist
8 The balance of nature is strong enough to cope 
with the impacts of modem industrial nations.
9 Despite our special abilities, humans are 
still subject to the laws o f nature.
10 The so-called "ecological crisis" facing 
humankind has been greatly exaggerated.
11 The earth is like a spaceship with very 
limited room and resources.
12 Humans were meant to rule over 
the rest of nature.
13 The balance of nature is very delicate 
and easily upset.
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SA A U D SD
14 Humans will eventually I earn enough about
how nature works to be able to control it.______________ __ __ __ __ __
15 If things continue on their present course, we 
willsoon experience a major ecological
catastrophe.______________________________________ __ __ __ __
Q-31 Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements, 
(mark the most appropriate column). SA= Strongly Agree, A=Agree, 
U=Uncertain, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree.
SA A U D SD
Participation in the WRP allows the 
government to interfere with the way
I choose to use my land.____________________________ __ __ __ __ __
1 believe that participating in the WRP
benefits society at my expense.______________________ __ __ __ __ __
I believe that participating in a conservation 
program like the WRP will improve
environmental quality._____________________________ __ __ __ __ __
Participating in the WRP permanently
limits my property rights.___________________________ __ __ __ __ __
I believe that participating in the WRP
will not benefit future generations.______________________ __ __ __ __
I will lose money if I participate in the WRP.___________ __ __ __ __ __
Participating in the WRP allows me 
to demonstrate the way I feel about 
the environenL
Q-32 Please evaluate the following statements and indicate your opinion, (mark the 
most appropriate column). VB =  Very Bad, B = Bad, N =  Neutral, G =  Good, 
VG =  Very Good.
VB B N G VG
Government involvement in the way
I choose to use my land is:____________________________ __ __ __ __
Preventing society from taking
advantage of me is:__________________________________ __ __ __ __
Improving the environment by participating
in conservation programs like the WRP is:_____________ __ __ __ __ __
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Permanent restrictions on my property 
rights are:
Benefitting future generations is:
Losing money due to of enrolling
in a conservation program like (he WRP is:
Backing up my feelings about the 
environment with real actions is:
VB N VG
Q-33 Please evaluate the following statements and indicate your opinion (mark the most 
appropriate column). VL=Very Likely, L = Likely, N=Neutral, U=Unlikely, 
VU=Very Unlikely.
vl l n  u  v u
My family would view enrollment
in the WRP favorably. __ __ __ __ __
My participation in the WRP is very important
to other wetland owners in my parish. __ __ __ __ __
Farm leaders think that I should enroll 
in the WRP.
The county agent thinks that I should 
enroll in the WRP.
It is important to my friends that I 
participate in the WRP.
Usually, I want to do what my 
family thinks I should do.
Usually, I want to do what other wetland 
owners in my parish think I should do.
Usually, I do what farm leaders think 
I should do.
Usually, I want to do what the 
county agent thinks I should do.
Usually, I want to do what most 
of my friends think I should do.
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Q-34 Do you currently belong to an environmental or conservation organization? 
(circle number)
1 Yes 2 No (if No, please skip to Q-36)
Q-35 If yes, how much were the yearly membership fees or the amount of the yearly 
donation?
$_____________
Q-36 Do you currently belong to any farm organization? (circle number)
1 Yes 2 No
Section V- SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES
The questions in this final section will help us learn about wetland owners in 
Louisiana. ALL the answers will remain strictly confidential.
Q-37 What is your sex? (circle number) 
1 Male 2 Female
Q-38 What is the highest level of education you have completed? (circle number)
1 Some Grade School 4 Some College
2 Some High School 5 Completed College
3 Completed High School 6 Advanced Degree
Q-39 Which of the following best describes your area of residence? (circle a number)
1 Rural Area or Small Town Gess than 1,000 people)
2 Small Town or Small City (1,000 to 10,000 people)
3 Medium or Large City (more than 10,000 people)
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Q-40 What is your present age? _______ years
Q-41 How many persons live in your household, including yourself?_____ persons
Q-42 Which of the following best describes your total household income for 1994? 
(circle number)
1 LESS Than $15,000 5 $45,000 to $54,999
2 $15,000 to $24,999 6 $55,000 to $64,000
3 $25,000 to $34,999 7 OVER $65,000
4 $35,000 to $44,999
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Section VH - SUGGESTIONS
If you have any suggestions or comments about wetlands or the Wetlands Reserve 
Program, please indicate them in this section.
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 
Louisiana State University Agricultural Center, Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803
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Table B .l
Prediction Success Table for the Probit Model Based 
on the Neoclassical Economic Approach
Actual
0 1
Predicted 0 12 6
1 16 109
Table B.2
Prediction Success Table for the Behavioral Model 
with the NEP Attitude Measure
Actual
0 1
Predicted 0 13 7
1 15 108
Table B.3
Prediction Success Table for the Behavioral Model 
with Measures of Attitude and Subjective Norm
Actual
0 1
Predicted 0 15 4
1 13 111
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Table C .l
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Means of Information about the WRP
How did you learn about WRP? Frequency Percent
Extension Service 106 60.9
Media: Magazine, TV or Radio 20 11.5
Neighbors, Friends or Family 42 24.1
Other 6 3.4
Table C.2
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Level of Information about the WRP







* Frequency Missing =  2
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
159
Table C.3
Frequency Table for the Type of Wetlands Owned by the Respondents
W hat type of wetlands do you own? * Frequency Percent
Bottomland hardwood forest 55 32.0
Freshwater swamps 7 4.1
Freshwater marsh 4 2.3
Brackish marsh 5 2.9
Farmed wetlands 93 54.1
Other 8 4.7
* Frequency Missing =  2
Table C.4
Frequency Table for the Main Crop Grown on Respondents’ Agricultural Land








* Frequency Missing = 24
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Table C.5
Frequency Table for the Evolution of the Yearly Net Average 
Return Per Acre of Wetland
Changes in your average net revenue per 





* Frequency Missing = 1 1
Table C.6
Frequency Table for the Respondent’s Future Plans for the Wetlands Owned
W hat are your future plans overall for the 
wetlands you currently own? *
Frequency Percent
Develop the land 3 1.8
Sell at fair market value 7 4.1
Convert to agriculture 2 1.2
Rent or lease 18 10.6
Try to enroll in a government program 81 47.6
Leave idle 17 10.0
Pass on to family 34 20.0
Other 8 4.7
* Frequency Missing = 4
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Table C.7
Frequency Table for the Respondents’ Offers to Participate in the 
Wetland Reserve Program





* Frequency Missing =  1
Table C.8
Frequency Table for the Respondents’ Enrollement in WRP
Did you enroll any of your wetlands in the 





Frequency Table for the Primary Factor Determining Participation in WRP
What was the primary factor that determined your 
decision to participate in the WRP?*
Frequency Percent
Non participants 101 58.0
Economic factors 20 11.5
Environmental factors 5 2.9
Economic and environmental factors 43 24.7
Other 5 2.9
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Table C. 10
Frequency Table for the New Environmental Paradigm Scale Statements
'  ■ -  ■ —  I -  II I .1, I. y I -  I I ■




Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly
Disagree
We are approaching the limit of the 
number of people the earth can support
16.1 25.9 20.7 31.0 6.3
Humans have the right to modify the 
natural environment to suit their needs
5.7 39.7 16.1 31.0 7.5
When humans interfere with nature it 
often produces disastrous consequences
21.3 50.6 12.1 10.9 5.2
Human ingenuity will ensure that we 
do not make the earth unlivable
8.0 31.6 31.6 16.1 12.6
Humans are severely abusing the 
environment
19.0 43.7 10.9 24.1 2.3
The earth has plenty of natural 
resources if we just learn how to 
develop them
19.5 58.6 9.8 9.8 2.3
Plants and animals have as much right 
as humans to exist
14.9 28.7 13.8 29.3 13.2
The balance of nature is strong enough 
to cope with the impacts of modem 
industrial nations
1.1 13.8 22.4 44.8 17.8
Despite our special abilities, humans 
are still subject to the laws of nature
22.4 69.5 4.6 2.9 0.6
The so-called “ecological crisis" facing 
humankind has been greatly exagerated
8.0 25.3 30.5 28.2 8.0
The earth is like a spaceship with very 
limited room and resources
10.3 50.6 14.9 21.8 2.3
Humans were meant to rule over the 
rest of nature
12.1 48.9 12.1 20.1 6.9
The balance of nature is delicate and 
easily upset
22.4 48.9 14.4 13.8 0.6
Humans will eventually learn enough 
about how nature works to be able to 
control it
4.0 24.7 21.8 41.4 8.0
If things continue on their present 
course, we will soon experience a 
major ecological catastrophe
5.2 25.9 33.3 28.2 7.5
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Table C. 11




Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Participation in the WRP allows the 
government to interfere with the way I 
choose to use my land
8.0 37.9 14.4 32.2 7.5
I believe that participating in the WRP 
benefits society at my expense
2.9 18.4 20.1 49.4 9.2
I believe that participating in a 
conservation program like WRP will 
improve environmental quality
29.9 58.6 9.2 1.7 0.6
Participating in the WRP permanently 
limits my property rights
16.7 51.7 14.4 15.5 1.7
I believe that participating in the WRP 
will not benefit future generations
1.7 5.2 10.9 56.3 25.9
I will lose money if I participate in the 
WRP
5.7 12.6 34.5 42.5 4.6
Participating in the WRP allows me to 
demonstrate the way I feel about the 
environment
14.9 51.1 19.0 12.6 2.3
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Table C. 12
Frequency Table for the Respondents’ Evaluation of the Behavioral Beliefs
Percent
Very Bad Bad Neutral Good Very Good
Government involvement in the way I 
choose to use my land is:
11.5 32.2 35.6 17.2 3.2
Preventing society from taking advantage 
of me is:
1.1 6.9 20.7 52.3 19.0
Improving the environment by participating 
in conservation programs like the WRP is:
1.7 1.1 14.4 47.1 35.6
Permanent restrictions on my 
property rights are:
21.8 33.3 32.8 9.8 2.3
Benefitting future generations is: 1.1 2.3 6.9 44.8 44.8
Losing money due to enrolling in a 
conservation program like the WRP is:
14.4 44.8 37.9 2.3 0.6
Backing up my feelings about the 
environment with real actions is:
1.1 2.9 17.2 60.3 18.4
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Table C. 13




Likely Neutral Unlikely Very
Unlikey
My family would view enrollment in the 
WRP favorably
41.4 31.0 17.8 7.5 2.3
My participation in the WRP is very 
important to other wetland owners 
in my parish
18.4 28.7 27.0 20.1 5.7
Farm leaders think that I should enroll 
in the WRP
10.3 23.0 46.6 14.4 5.7
The county agent thinks that I should enroll 
in the WRP
14.9 29.3 42.5 9.2 4.0
It is important to my friends that I enroll in 
the WRP
8.0 19.5 44.8 17.2 10.3
Usually, I want to do what my family 
thinks I should do
13.2 37.9 28.2 13.2 7.5
Usually, I want to do what other wetland 
owners in my parish think I should do
2.9 14.4 37.9 29.3 15.5
Usually, I do what farm leaders 
think I should do
2.3 16.7 38.5 29.3 13.2
Usually, I want to do what the county agent 
thinks I should do
6.3 21.8 37.9 23.0 10.9
Usually, I want to do what most of my 
friends think I should do
2.9 12.1 42.5 27.0 15.5
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Table C. 14
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Involvement in Environmental Organizations





♦Frequency Missing =  3
Table C. 15
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Involvement in Farm Organizations
Do you currently belong to any farm organization?4 Frequency Percent
Yes 84 50.0
No 84 50.0
♦Frequency Missing =  6
Table C. 16 
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Gender
W hat is your sex?4 Frequency Percent
Male 144 83.7
Female 28 16.3
♦Frequency Missing =  2
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Table C.17
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Education Level
W hat is the highest level of education you 
have completed?^
Frequency Percent
Some Grade School 3 1.8
Some High School 6 3.5
Completed High School 36 21.1
Some College 42 24.6
Completed College 52 30.4
Advanced Degree 32 18.7
♦Frequency Missing =  3
Table C. 18
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Area of Residence
Which of the following best describes your area 
of residence? ♦
Frequency Percent
Rural Area or Small Town (less than 1,000 people) 76 44.4
Small Town or Small City (1,000 to 10,000 people) 42 24.6
Medium or Large City (more than 10,000 people) 53 31.0
♦Frequency Missing =  3
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Table C. 19
Frequency Table for Respondents’ Income Level
Which of the following best describes your 
total household income for 1994?*
Frequency Percent
Less Than $15,000 9 5.6
$15,000 to $24,999 11 6.9
$25,000 to $34,999 23 14.4
$35,000 to $44,999 13 8.1
$45,000 to $54,999 12 7.5
$55,000 to $64,999 15 9.4
OVER $65,000 77 48.1
♦Frequency Missing = 14
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Table C.20 
Summary Statistics for the Continuous Variables of the Louisiana Wetland Survey
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
Error
Total Acres of Land Owned 1118.28 2.00 8800.00 1566.28
Acres of Agricultural Land Owned 856.64 0.00 8500.00 1428.82
Acres of Wetlands Owned 484.43 0.00 6400.00 858.06
How long have you owned the wetlands? 21.84 4.00 100.00 19.54
How many acres of wetlands have you 
converted to agriculture?
81.72 0.00 3500.00 331.79
How many acres of wetlands have you 
converted to other uses?
53.99 0.00 1500.00 195.78
Family labor 0.76 0.00 6.00 1.17
Outside Hired Labor 2.68 0.00 50.00 6.29
Yearly average gross revenue per acre 1367.90 0.00 35000 5799.53
Yearly average net revenue per acre 361.34 0.00 12500 1810.95
Acres offered for enrollment in the WRP in 92 100.50 0.00 1700 286.01
Acres offered for enrollment in the WRP in 94 147.31 0.00 5640 548.98
Acres offered for enrollment in the WRP in 95 143.48 0.00 1000 202.84
How much did you bid or have been offered 
per acre of wetlands in 1992?
128.08 0.00 1000 252.13
How much did you bid or have been offered 
per acre of wetlands in 1994?
131.11 0.00 1000 231.99
How much did you bid or have been offered 
per acre of wetlands in 1995?
239.79 0.00 1000 290.20
How many acres of wetlands did you enroll in 
the WRP in 1992?
90 0.00 1200 238.52
How many acres of wetlands did you enroll in 
the WRP in 1994?
169.27 0.00 5640 669.16
How many acres of wetlands did you enroll in 
the WRP in 1995?
122.15 0.00 875 192.43
How much money did you receive (or have 
been offered) per acre enrolled in 1992?
137.30 0.00 800 246.56
How much money did you receive (or have 
been offered) per acre enrolled in 1994?
144.00 0.00 650 226.77
(table con’d.)
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Mean M inim um Maximum Standard
Error
How much money did you receive (or have 
been offered) per acre enrolled in 1995?
267.00 0.00 800 279.27
Yearly membership fees for environmental 
organization?
103.01 0.00 5000 465.50
What is your present age? 55.41 23.00 83 13.59
How many persons live in your household? 2.68 1.00 7.00 1.27
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Table D .l 
Eigenvalues and Variance Proportions for Variables Used in the Neoclassical 
Economic Models
VARIABLES
Hitenvalue Ltotal Lwet Revenue Knowrn Infowrn Wetfarm Cron
l 0.21 0.031 0.027 0.022 0.001 0.007 0.012 0.000
2 0.401 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.027 0.002 0.030 0.071
3 0.55 0.001 0.018 0.016 0.010 0.001 0.098 0.079
4 0.591 0.014 0.052 0.008 0.039 0.143 0.065 0.000
5 0.664 0.081 0.035 0.000 0.020 0.141 0.001 0.102
6 0.764 0.000 0.007 0.089 0.422 0.037 0.034 0.000
7 0.841 0.007 0.012 0.386 0.047 0.004 0.069 0.074
8 0.926 0.003 0.000 0.109 0.134 0.011 0.114 0.298
9 1.084 0.002 0.017 0.027 0.029 0.519 0.003 0.208
10 1.179 0.012 0.026 0.114 0.095 0.007 0.047 0.002
11 1.314 0.047 0.002 0.097 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.025
12 1.36 0.038 0.003 0.003 0.033 0.066 0.292 0.002
13 1.477 0.090 0.224 0.028 0.070 0.000 0.102 0.005
14 ._2.639. n fi77 n S71 nnQS 0 077 OOS7 0 178 n m
(table con’d.)
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
VARIABLES
fci zenval Envor Gender Educate Reside Laee Denend Income ll
1 0.21 0.039 0.005 0.029 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.043
2 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.019 0.133 0.202 0.002
3 0.55 0.022 0.156 0.013 0.124 0.005 0.024 0.005
4 0.591 0.021 0.053 0.012 0.052 0.100 0.001 0.005
5 0.664 0.006 0.112 0.040 0.052 0.020 0.000 0.002
6 0.764 0.001 0.001 0.088 0.029 0.064 0.004 0.002
7 0.841 0.104 0.003 0.002 0.058 0.015 0.044 0.012
8 0.926 0.001 0.016 0.270 0.007 0.003 0.014 0.001
9 1.084 0.006 0.203 0.017 0.021 0.039 0.002 0.007
.0 1.179 0.077 0.003 0.089 0.003 0.171 0.200 0.188
.1 1.314 0.005 0.278 0.160 0.551 0.099 0.012 0.031
.2 1.36 0.506 0.000 0.225 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.051
.3 1.477 0.044 0.099 0.014 0.072 0.199 0.339 0.275
4 2.639 0.169 ..0.07L- 0.031 0.000 . 0.100 0.156 _0.375.
Table D.2
Condition Indexes for Variables Used in the Neoclassical Economic Models
1.00 1.33 1.39 1.41 1.49 1.56
1.68 1.77 1.85 1.99 2.11 2.19
2.56 3.54
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Table D.3 
Eigenvalues and Variance Proportions for Variables Used in 
the Behavioral Economic Models with NEP
Variables
Cieenvaluc Ltotal I. wet Revenue Knowrn Infowrn Wetfarm Cron
1 0.201 0.029 0.027 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.000
2 0.386 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.026 0.002 0.031 0.072
3 0.5 0.008 0.029 0.029 0.010 0.002 0.121 0.036
4 0.591 0.014 0.030 0.004 0.037 0.120 0.021 0.010
5 0.659 0.055 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.003 0.164
6 0.742 0.015 0.024 0.001 0.236 0.027 0.001 0.004
7 0.766 0.000 0.018 0.125 0.238 0.028 0.038 0.005
8 0.924 0.007 0.014 0.323 0.026 0.005 0.081 0.113
9 1.078 0.006 0.008 0.064 0.005 0.414 0.007 0.345
1C 1.118 0.014 0.025 0.045 0.074 0.124 0.220 0.097
11 1.198 0.003 0.016 0.150 0.112 0.023 0.007 0.001
12 1.321 0.040 0.002 0.101 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.028
13 1.399 0.009 0.045 0.005 0.113 0.035 0.263 0.007
14 1.477 0.081 0.151 0.057 0.029 0.000 0.052 0.000
2.639 0.717 0.598 0.069 ._ £Lfl£>3__ 0.062 0.136... 0.118
(table con’d.)
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Variables
k i|senval Envore Gender Educate Reside Laee Denend Income Lnen
1 0.201 0.039 0.005 0.028 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.043 0.000
2 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.019 0.132 0.202 0.002 0.000
3 ' 0.5 0.036 0.088 0.014 0.048 0.014 0.020 0.001 0.079
4 0.591 0.010 0.113 0.015 0.118 0.069 0.000 0.009 0.010
5 0.659 0.001 0.045 0.008 0.074 0.046 0.004 0.003 0.087
6 0.742 0.002 0.084 0.042 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.267
7 0.766 0.002 0.004 0.158 0.018 0.050 0.007 0.002 0.048
8 0.924 0.104 0.007 0.013 0.051 0.016 0.052 0.011 0.003
9 1.078 0.019 0.166 0.000 0.013 0.029 0.003 0.004 0.012
0 1.118 0.060 0.035 0.136 0.013 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.177
1 1.198 0.025 0.003 0.079 0.005 0.214 0.208 0.195 0.019
.2 1.321 0.002 0.278 0.163 0.548 0.090 0.014 0.028 0.000
.3 1.399 0.445 0.001 0.217 0.001 0.008 0.020 0.074 0.156
.4 1.477 0.147 0.109 0.057 0.075 0.230 0.332 0.262 0.079
5 2.639 0.109 0.061 0.061 0.001 0.080 0.136 0.357 0.063
Table D.4
Condition Indexes for Variables Used in Models with NEP Measure
1.00 1.33 1.37 1.41 1.48 1.53
1.56 1.69 1.85 1.88 2.00 2.11
2.29 2.61 3.62
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Table D.5 
Eigenvalues and Variance Proportions for Variables Used in the 
Models with Measures of Attitudes and Subjective Norm Derived 




^nxahu Ltotal .. Lwet Revenue Known) fnfnwrn Wetfarm Cron Envore
0.202 0.027 0.024 0.017 0.000 0.008 0.012 0.000 0.036
2 0.396 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.021 0.070 0.000
3 0.539 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.023 0.042 0.038 0.036 0.004
4 0.572 0.006 0.050 0.035 0.020 0.121 0.120 0.033 0.038
5 0.596 0.000 0.001 0.031 0.289 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.668 0.083 0.050 0.014 0.022 0.046 0.008 0.102 0.005
7 0.812 0.017 0.005 0.353 0.004 0.037 0.078 0.009 0.017
8 0.836 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.146 0.067 0.070 0.275 0.010
9 0.867 0.001 0.005 0.123 0.080 0.028 0.054 0.047 0.044
10 0.989 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.306 0.006 0.030 0.137
11 1.213 0.002 0.047 0.067 0.027 0.153 0.026 0.099 0.000
12 1.262 0.013 0.005 0.068 0.197 0.042 0.000 0.093 0.000
13 1.331 0.022 0.001 0.136 0.033 0.000 0.029 0.094 0.023
14 1.388 0.087 0.000 0.019 0.057 0.080 0.275 0.002 0.468
15 1.599 0.075 0.211 0.015 0.059 0.004 0.122 0.011 0.039
16 2.73 0.662 .0.586 , 0.106 0.044 . 0.052 0.141 0.099 0.180
(table con’d.)
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1 Variables
feioenvaliM Gender Educate Reside I--ase Denend Income Attitude Subnorm
1 0.202 0.006 0.026 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.038 0.008 0.008
2 0.396 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.108 0.120 0.003 0.054 0.061
3 0.539 0.201 0.016 0.120 0.007 0.014 0.011 0.024 0.023
4 0.572 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.009
5 0.596 0.010 0.060 0.006 0.006 0.088 0.000 0.057 0.090
6 0.668 0.022 0.050 0.107 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.026 0.023
7 0.812 0.054 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.019 0.007 0.152 0.024
8 0.836 0.046 0.000 0.002 0.065 0.032 0.001 0.016 0.210
9 0.867 0.076 0.314 0.045 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.058 0.056
10 0.989 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.124 0.047 0.011 0.237 0.000
11 1.213 0.150 0.001 0.014 0.108 0.024 0.132 0.000 0.258
12 1.262 0.031 0.193 0.010 0.069 0.153 0.099 0.248 0.065
13 1.331 0.186 0.171 0.518 0.042 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.124
14 1.388 0.026 0.091 0.016 0.051 0.007 0.020 0.061 0.020
15 1.599 0.082 0.012 0.096 0.200 0.350 0.266 0.003 0.025
16 -2J3 . 0.088 ,.0.028_ ,0.000 0.105 0.133 0.397 —0*050, 0.004
Table D.6 
Condition Indexes for Variables Used in Models with Measures of Attitudes 
and Subjective Norm Derived from the Theory of Reasoned Action
1.00 1.30 1.40 1.43 1.47 1.50
1.66 1.77 1.80 1.83 2.02 2.13
2.18 2.25 2.62 3.67
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